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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Undoing Recognition: 
A Critical Approach to Pose in Photography 
 
 
Fulya Ertem 
 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
    September, 2006 
 
 
 
 
This study aims to give an account of the act of posing in photography in terms of the 
self/image relationship in order to foreground an unexplored aspect of the pose that is 
its potential to question (self-)recognition and/or (self-)identification. By departing 
from an analysis of portrait photographs belonging to different cultures and historical 
periods, this thesis attempts to provide a critical approach to the act of posing through a 
productive communication between visual and theoretical texts and provides a new 
approach to the subject/image relationship.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
Tanımayı Bozmak: 
Fotoğrafa Poz Verme Anına Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım 
 
Fulya Ertem 
 
Danışman: Yard. Doç.Dr.Mahmut Mutman 
    Eylül, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Bu çalışma, fotoğrafa poz verme hakkında, öz/imge arasındaki ilişkiyi göz önünde 
tutarak, poz vermenin şimdiye kadar vurgulanmamış olan, öz-tanı(n)ma ve 
özdeşleşme’yi sorgulamasına değinmektedir. Farklı kültür ve tarihlere ait portre 
fotoğraflarının incelenmesinden yola çıkarak, görsel ve teorik metinlerin yapıcı bir 
şekilde buluştuğu bu çalışma, poz verme anına eleştirel bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler:  Poz vermek, Fotoğraf, İmgeleme, Öz-tanı(n)ma, Portrelemek, 
August Sander, Ergün Turan 
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There’s something disturbing about this image (Figure 1). Like many disturbing things, 
this one is hard to localise, to point out easily. One needs a certain time of 
communication with the image in order to figure out what really is disturbing, so, let’s 
start with a close analysis of this photograph.  
To start with, what strikes one in this photograph is the coexistence of two 
different attitudes vis-à-vis the camera and the moment of this picture being taken. Two 
persons, whose physical traits have things in common and who therefore create the 
impression that they may be a mother and her son, are looking at the camera. But it 
seems as if they are seeing different things.  
The woman, staring at the camera straight, has the expression on her face of 
someone, whose eyes are fixed on an invisible point without seeing anything, as if 
hypnotised. The fact that her eyebrows are high as if a little surprise has left its trace, 
and the way her mouth is nearly going to open itself, not to talk but rather to lose 
control, increases this sense of being hypnotised. The pattern of her dress seems to 
speak in her place because of its contrast with her inexpressive face. She seems to be 
either thoughtless or completely trapped in her thoughts.  
In either case she seems to be only physically there, in this moment. She is like a 
puppet put on a chair, her hands lying heavily on her knees. A detail from her dress, the 
dark vertical line, right in the middle of her upper body, like a thin black stick, (either a 
shadow or a fold of her dress), increases this impression of being a puppet. This is so 
because it may also remind us of an expression used to describe people who are not 
natural, and who pretend to be someone else: “Someone who swallowed a stick”.  
                                                                                                                                                               
1 Parts of the introduction and Chapter 1 were written in 2002 during my preliminary graduate studies 
at The University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.  
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All these details and impressions about the way she is situated in front of the camera 
give the feeling that she is forced to immobilise herself to the point of becoming frozen, 
to the point of becoming unresponsive to what is happening around.  
But is posing not an act in which the subject is aware of his or her posing? In 
order to pose doesn’t one pretend to “be”? And is pretending not an act of self-
consciousness? Rather than being self-conscious this woman seems to be hypnotised, to 
have lost all power over herself. Although she probably chose to sit there of her own 
will, it seems that something must have changed when she faced the camera.  
   The boy standing next to the woman has a different kind of stare. First of all his 
eye level is higher than the level of the camera lens. Unlike the woman, he has to look 
down a little, with his head slightly inclined to the right. Whether he is forced to look 
at a point indicated by the photographer or whether this stare is his own choice, he 
looks as if he is aware of what he is looking at because he seems to choose to orient his 
eyes according to this indication. This lowering of his eyes and the gentle air of his face, 
created by the beginning of a smile gives him also an air of obedience.  
Although compared with the woman he is in a much more difficult position, 
since he has to stand up instead of sitting, he seems nevertheless more relaxed. The way 
his shoulders are slack, the curvilinear folds on the arms of his coat, the way his coat is 
unbuttoned and the fact that his right foot extends slightly beyond his left foot increases 
the impression that his body is much more subtle, ready to loosen its forced position.  
Two things that seem to contrast with this subtlety and that seem to be imposed 
on him are the flowers he is holding with his fingertips and the way his arm is folded 
while holding them. Like the handkerchief in the pocket of his coat, the flowers seem to 
be put there by convention. Like the handkerchief, the flowers do not belong there. 
The handkerchief, as a sign of seriousness, contrasts with the casualness of the coat. The 
 4 
flowers contrast with the ineptness of the hand holding them. It is as if any object could 
be in the place of these flowers. One may have the impression that his hands are not 
holding the flowers; they are just acting as if they are holding them in a pantomime. 
Considering all these details we can say that the boy doesn’t look like he really 
believes in his pose. He looks like a mediocre actor because his body bears some traces 
of casualness, creating a contrast between the imposed pose (most probably by the 
photographer) and the performance of that pose. Although he seems to have an 
impression of being obedient, this obedience is not total one because he still looks as if 
he hasn’t been able to assimilate these instructions.  
As to the woman, she seems as if she hasn’t even made an attempt to 
appropriate a pose. She looks like she is not responding to what is happening at that 
moment. She seems not to be aware of, or to understand what is going on. She seems 
to look at us from a different level. These two different attitudes in the moment of 
taking the photograph have however an important similarity to each other: Both the 
woman and the boy are having difficulties in assuming a pose. 
Departing from this analysis we can say that this photograph shows what 
different reactions a photographic camera can encounter. One may be hypnotised and 
unable to assume a pose; another may try but not manage to assume a pose. These 
different reactions are the starting point of my inquiry about the nature of posing. I am 
interested in these reactions because they may open up the question of the attempt at 
(self-) recognition and (self-) identification. 
Despite the power of the photographic camera to confer an identity upon the 
poseur2 at the expense of his or her being, posing in front of a camera can preclude the 
impact of this power by preventing the posing subject from assuming a specific identity. 
                                                           
2 I am using the word “poseur” to mean “poser” in this thesis to emphasize the artificiality of the pose. 
 5 
The purpose of this thesis is thus to analyse in detail the moment of posing and reveal 
the ways in which it can be considered as a moment that brings into question the notion 
of subjectivity. 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
More specifically, the purpose of this study is to establish an account of the pose in 
terms of the self/image relationship, in order to foreground an unexplored aspect of 
the pose: that is, its potential for inducing in the subject a sense of alterity and thus 
providing him/her with a productive look that leads to a questioning of (self-) recognition 
and/or (self-)identification.  
The expression productive look was coined by Kaja Silverman in her book The 
Threshold of the Visible World (1996). It refers to the possibility of seeing 
productively, in other words, a way of conceiving the “self” and the “other” in a 
productive way that is not determined in advance by the social codes of recognition and 
identification.  
This thesis is thus re-considering the act of posing (generally conceived as a way 
of appropriating the ideal image of the “self”, imposed by culture, and as an attempt to 
be affirmed by social norms), as an act in which the subject is reminded of his/her 
abyssal emptiness and through which he/she can have a critical distance to the 
normative ways of (self-) representation and (self-)recognition. 
  
1.2 Methodology  
To produce an analysis of the act of posing, one can consult one’s personal experiences 
or the experiences of others, of the moment of posing. But the aim of this work is not  
 6 
simply to provide an account of the pose from the viewpoint of the posing subject but 
rather to explore the nature of the pose through a close analysis of the images of posing 
subjects.  
Since it might be superficial to reduce every act of posing to an act of productive 
looking, because not all expositions of the act of posing can lend themselves to this kind 
of theoretical analysis, this thesis bases itself on some specific instances of the pose 
where the posing subject, despite his/her efforts to secure his/her identity, appears to 
fail to conform to the cultural codes of (self-)recognition and (self-)representation (the 
cultural screen in Silverman’s terms). The motivations behind the choice of the objects of 
research will be mentioned more in detail below in the next section.  
One of the best instances of such a failure occurs after the invention of the 
photographic camera in contrast with portrait painting, because a new kind of 
relationship is established between the subject and its image. Therefore this thesis bases 
itself on an analysis of a corpus of photographic portraits from a range of cultural and 
historical perspectives. It thus analyses images emerging both from the Western and 
non-Western cultural screen but also belonging both to the early period of photographic 
practice and to the recent practice of portraying through photographic means. 
 Therefore, this work focuses on an analysis of photographic portraits where in 
each analysis photographs are analysed and confronted with theoretical texts, in order 
to contribute to the questioning and re-conceptualisation of the act of posing. 
 
1.3 Limitations and objects of research 
This thesis covers a subject that is wide in its practice. Posing has indeed been an 
intrinsic part of many artistic practices. But both for reasons of limiting my work and 
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because of the photographic image’s specificity claiming an incontestable power over its 
referent, I want to base my argument on a study of photographic portraiture.  
One of the important figures in portrait photography is a man who dedicated his 
life to the documentation of “expressive and characteristic features, which 
circumstance, life and times have stamped upon the face”3. He is the German 
photographer, August Sander, who photographed subjects from all walks of life and 
created a typological catalogue of more than six hundred photographs of the German 
people. This life-long photographic project is called Citizens of the Twentieth Century. 
Aspiring to record the historical physiognomic image of a whole generation, these 
portraits became an accumulative image of an entire social order since Sander portrayed 
a world of individuals defined through their public roles. 
However, despite his desire to categorise the various strata of German society, 
his photographs bare traces of incongruities and contradictions in the self-projections of 
the poseurs. Therefore this corpus not only constitutes a long-term documentation 
(since it consists of portrait photographs taken between 1892 and 1952) but also 
provides interesting examples for the possible questioning and reconsideration of the 
act of posing. Therefore the motivation behind my choice of Sander’s project lie on the 
fact that his project provides specific examples of the posing subjects who expose some 
paradoxes and contradicts with the assumed aim of the project. 
In order to facilitate an engagement between the past and the present and 
between the Western and non-Western cultural realms, and because of its connections 
with Sander’s project in different levels, my second object of inquiry is a more recent 
but similar Turkish photographic project entitled “Biz” (“Us”). This project is executed 
                                                           
3 Sander quoted in August Sander: Citizens of the Twentieth Century London: 1986 p.13 
 8 
by the young Turkish photographers Süreyya Yılmaz Dernek and Ergün Turan and 
published as a book under the same title, Biz (2002).  
In their project Dernek and Turan invite people from different social and 
economic backgrounds to take off their “masks” and try to capture them as freed as 
possible from assumed poses. Their method is to take photographs of the multitude of 
faces in Istanbul streets, by asking the passers-by to stop their daily life for a few 
minutes of posing in front of a mobile dark background that they carry with them to 
different districts of the city. With this project they thus attempt to expose both the 
uniqueness of each individual, as well as their familiarity, by letting us participate in an 
encounter with a wide range of faces that nevertheless seem to carry with them the 
common characteristics of human existence: the quest of filling their emptiness.  
The main motivation behind the specific choice of these objects of research lie 
on the fact that both of the projects have similar concerns about portraying individuals 
such the as the desire to provide a “national identity”, but nevertheless failing in 
framing, fixing or categorising the “subject”. Moreover, a part from their similarities, 
these projects have also some contradictions in the way they approach to the framing or 
“representation” of the “subject” that will be revealed while analysing these projects in 
the fourth and fifth chapter. 
Overall, an analysis of these two main objects of study will not only provide the 
reader with both an enlarged scope of photographs belonging to different periods of 
time, as well as present two ways of portraying individuals within different societies, 
but also, provide a comparable ground in which the posing subject seems to reveal, 
encounter or face the impossibility of such a framing. In other words these projects are 
specifically exemplary in providing the space for questioning the notion of subjectivity. 
 
 9 
1.4 Structure 
The overall thesis engages with Kaja Silverman’s critical approach to the process of 
(self-)identification and (self-)recognition in her book The Threshold of the Visible 
World (1996). Therefore this book is used as an important source of reference and 
inspiration among the other sources that will be mentioned in detail below.  
 The chapter entitled “Portraiture and early photographic practice” introduces a 
general overview of the period of the emergence of photography in Western culture, 
focusing particularly on the observable changes in the act of posing after the invention 
of photography, in contrast with painting, especially in the field of portraiture.   
To do this, it starts by providing an introduction to portraiture in general and 
then discusses the particularity of photographic portraiture by referring to some 
photographs of that specific period. My aim in this chapter is to argue first of all that 
portraiture is a problematic and paradoxical means of representation, already 
questioning the relationship between the subject and its image.  
Secondly, it claims that there is a change in the conception and execution of 
portraiture after the invention of photography according to which photography 
establishes a new kind of relationship between the subject and its image: in its desire to 
put an end to the paradoxes of portraiture, photography claimed at the very beginnings 
of its practice to be a “scientific” and “objective” representation, exercising a power 
over its referent. 
Lastly, by focusing on the act of posing and analysing some photographs 
belonging to the early years of photographic practice, this chapter claims that, despite 
the power of photography to confer an identity upon the posing subject, the poseurs of 
some early portrait photographs seem to fail to conform to the social codes of (self-) 
recognition and (self-) identification and are unable to assume any identity. 
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The main conclusion in this chapter is that there existed in the portrait photographs of 
the early period some clues about the impossibility of seeing it as an entirely successful 
act of self-appropriation. 
After this introduction to portraiture and the discussion about the particularity 
of portrait photography with an emphasis on the poses of the sitters, the next chapter 
discusses in more detail the act (of posing) itself, enlisting the help of some 
psychoanalytical and philosophical approaches to the problematic of (self-) recognition 
and/or (self-) identification.  
Thus, it starts by referring to Jacques Lacan’s assertion that identity is a visual 
construction, achieved through visual identification, in his famous article “The Mirror 
stage as formative of the function of the I” while stressing the paradoxes of (self-) 
identification and/or (self-)recognition. 
 It also presents the re-readings of “The Mirror Stage” by Kaja Silverman and 
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen who base their arguments on the different accounts of some 
other psychoanalysts such as Sigmund Freud, Paul Schilder and Henri Wallon, and who 
argue that the formation of the “I” (or of the ego) is based not only on the presence of 
an external image (the mirror image) but on an incorporation of that image that 
necessitates the agency of bodily sensations, (the proprioceptive ego).  
After giving an account of the relationship between the proprioceptive and 
exteroceptive egos4 and foregrounding the paradoxical existence of the “self” that is 
“constituted” through a conjunction of the external image with bodily sensations, this 
chapter analyses the act of posing and tries to reveal its particularity by referring to Kaja 
Silverman’s, Craig Owens’ and Roland Barthes’ accounts of the pose.  
                                                           
4 These terms will be explained in the section entitled “The ‘self’ in between body and image” of 
Chapter 3, section 3.2, pp. 49. 
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Following this, it tries to demonstrate that the act of posing is an act which dramatically 
reminds the posing subject of the gap existing between his/her bodily sensations 
(proprioceptive ego) and his exteroceptive (self-)image. This chapter thus mainly argues that 
unlike in the “mirror stage”, the posing subject might not experience as powerfully the 
momentary satisfaction and illusion of the coincidence between his/her bodily 
sensations and his/her image. 
Departing from this argument the last part of the chapter will try to show how 
posing can be considered as an uncanny act that reveals the impossibility of (self-) 
identification in which the poseur’s subjectivity is endlessly deferred.  
To be able to show this, it will first provide a reading of Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe’s Portrait de l’Artiste en Général (1979) where he questions (self-) 
identification through an analysis of Urs Lüthi’s photographic self-portraits and 
foregrounds the impossibility of recognising and/or identifying the “self”. Secondly it 
will provide an account of the Freudian uncanny in order to argue that the moment of 
the pose is a moment of uncanniness because “the uncanny” is an anxiety born out of the 
impossibility of representation. 
The next chapter, entitled: “August Sander’s poseurs: towards a possibility of 
questioning the “self” in conflict/paradox will try to consolidate the arguments 
proposed in the previous chapter, this time through an analysis of August Sander’s 
photographs. After providing an introduction to Sander’s work and historical 
background, it attempts to reveal the ways the poseurs of Sander’s photographs may 
contradict his entire project (which might be considered an attempt to give an objective 
and hierarchically categorised image of the German people at the time).  
In order to achieve this, this chapter introduces first how the subject’s 
relationship to photography and to the photographic camera can constitute the way 
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he/she apprehends, recognises his/her “self” and how photography can categorise and 
frame the “subject”, as in the case of Sander’s attempt. Therefore it introduces and 
opens up Kaja Silverman’s concepts of the (cultural) screen and dominant fiction in order 
to see whether the act of posing can be a moment of questioning/challenging our 
perspective vis-à-vis (self-) identification and/or (self-) recognition.  
 It also  provides a detailed analysis of Sander’s photographs, referring to Leo 
Rubinfien and Graham Clarke’s reading of Sander’s photographs in order to argue that 
Sander’s poseurs expose the “self in conflict”, most specifically in the sense that they 
seem to exhibit some contradiction and incongruities between the “public” and the 
“private” manifestations of the “self”. 
This chapter thus aims to reveal some of the ways the subject can assume a 
critical distance on the social norms and normative ways of (self-) identification and of 
(self-) recognition by analysing and foregrounding the contradictions and the conflicts 
Sander’s poseurs’ exhibit at the moment of the pose. 
The next chapter, entitled: “‘Biz’ (Us): the pose as a Productive look” focuses on 
my second object of inquiry while introducing the name Silverman gives to this critical 
distance that is the productive look. Thus, this chapter aims to introduce my conclusive 
argument by trying to give an answer to the question of how the act of posing can 
induce in the subject a productive look. As a possible answer to this question it will try to 
argue that the subject’s specular encounter with his/her “self” at the moment of posing 
is an encounter with “discontinuity” and “otherness”.  
In order to consolidate this argument this chapter will on the one hand re-
introduce Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s philosophical approach to (self-) representation in 
photographic portraiture, in terms of the self/other problematic, and on the other 
hand, it will analyse Dernek and Turan’s  photographs in the light of Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
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notion of the “allo-portrait” (that is, the presence of the self as “other”, both as personne 
[in the sense of nobody] and as the “other” that is externally given to be recognised).  
The conclusion this chapter will lead towards is the argument that the act of 
posing can provoke in the subject an encounter with “discontinuity” and “otherness” and 
thus it can provide the ground or the space for a productive model of relationship 
between the subject and its “self”. In other words, this chapter will try to argue that the 
act of posing might expose the impossibility of self-sameness and aims to provide a 
ground in which self-recognition and self-identification are questioned. Departing from 
an analysis of Dernek and Turan’s poseurs, this chapter thus reveals that the moment of 
posing can be considered as a moment of the productive look that prevents a definition, 
recognition and/or affirmation of subjectivity according to the parameters of self-
sameness. 
  
1.5 Positioning of the project in the academic field, relations to recent 
developments in the field. 
In recent critical writing, the question of the pose has not been approached specifically. 
Therefore this thesis constitutes an important reference for those who want a more 
specific account of the pose. Moreover, the very few texts that take up the pose, as 
their problematic seem to approach it from a limited perspective.  
One approach that is stressed in Craig Owens’ “Posing” (In Beyond 
Recognition: Representation, Power, and Culture (1992)) is a social approach that 
tends to define posing as a reaction to the surveillance of society by the agencies of the 
State. This approach which, according to Owens, is supported by critics such as Homi 
Bhabha (who indirectly refers to the pose while discussing mimicry in colonial 
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discourse) and Dick Hebdige, regards the pose as a defensive act against the penetration 
of society into the private sphere.5   
In addition to this approach, Craig Owens and Kaja Silverman consider the 
pose, in their respective works “Posing”(1992), and The Threshold of the Visible World 
(1996) as a way of offering oneself to the social gaze, already in the guise of a particular 
picture, that is to say, they see it as an act that is driven by a desire to create an “image” 
of oneself in order to be affirmed and thus constructed by the social norms as well as a 
mechanism through which the subject enters into the social realm. 
However, it seems to me that all these approaches miss the potential of the pose 
to question these aforementioned social norms and to provide the subject with a 
productive look towards his/her (self) identification and (self-) recognition. 
This thesis is thus analyses the act of posing from a perspective that reveals its 
importance as a paradoxical moment in the relationship between the “self” and its 
image, reminding us that it can be a moment of the manifestation of the human 
condition of emptiness as well as a moment of questioning the process of (self-) 
identification and (self-) recognition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
5
 In Homi Bhabha’s, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse” October 28, 1984 
and Dick Hebdige’s “Posing…Threats, Striking…Poses: Youth Surveillance and Display” SubStance 
37/38, 1983. 
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The face is a reality par excellence, 
where a being does not present itself 
by its qualities.6 
 
Emmanuel Lévinas, Difficult Freedom  
 
Isabelle stares into the camera. It is like 
looking into herself, a strangely 
disconnected feeling. 
 
Helen Humphrey, Afterimage 
 
The thing that must seem inhuman or 
even immortal in the Daguerreotype is 
that, it forced to look at a machine 
(long time in fact) that was receiving 
the image of man without returning his 
glance.7 
 
Walter Benjamin,  
On Some Baudelairian Themes 
 
 
2) Portraiture and early photographic practice 
 
 
2.1 The origins and paradoxes of 
portraiture 
 
 Since the first attempts at visual representation, 
mankind has had a tendency to believe in the 
presence of an essence that characterises human 
being, and it searched for the manifestations of 
this essence, be it the soul and/or subjectivity, 
on the human face. In fact, the face, as the 
border between the interior and the exterior, 
was considered a mysterious site where human 
                                                           
6 “Le visage est une réalité par excellence, où un être ne se présente pas par ses qualités”, Emmanuel 
Levinas, Difficile Liberté, Livre de Poche : Paris, 2003. My Translation. 
7 “Ce qui devait paraitre inhumain, on pourrait meme dire mortel, dans le daguerréotype, c’est qu’il 
forçait a regarder (longuement d’ailleurs) un appareil qui recevait l’image de l’homme sans lui rendre 
son regard.” Walter Benjamin, Sur Quelques Themes Baudelairens , Poesie et Revolution, Paris, Denoel, 
1971. My translation. 
Fig.2 
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essence was believed to manifest itself. Ergun Kocabıyık, describes the mystery of the 
face in his book Yazılı Yüz (The Written Face) as follows: 
At some period of our lives, we discover the uniqueness of our face and we are awed by 
its truthfulness. This feeling leads us to find the answer to some questions we had 
consciously asked. What is this face reflected in the mirror? This question stands up in 
front of mankind as a problematic of essence it has to solve. The face is like an illegible 
text written in an unknown language; it is the secret into the debts of which we 
continuously return to (1997, 9).8 
 
The face is thus believed to be a mystery that both hides but also reveals some truth 
about human nature, and many artistic and scientific traditions have devoted themselves 
to the pursuit of capturing the face, through portraiture. 
Related to the 16th-century French word portraire, meaning: “The line which 
one draws to shape the outline of something.”9 (Pommier, 1998, 15-16), portraiture 
was initially used to refer to a visual description and/or inscription of an object on a 
surface, by drawing its contour or its shadow with the help of light.  
However, in the 17th century, the term becomes more specific. As it appears in 
the dictionary of artistic terms of André Félibien, the usage of the word portraire is 
limited to the representation of the human subject:  
The word portraire is a general word that can point towards anything that 
has to do with forming the resemblance of something. However, we don’t 
use it for any sort of subjects. We can say the portrait of a man or that of a 
woman, but we cannot say the portrait of a horse or of a house or of a tree. 
We say the figure of a horse, the representation of a house, the figure of a 
tree.10(Felibien quoted in Pommier,1998, 16).  
                                                           
8  “Yaşamımızın bir döneminde kendi yüzümüzün biricikliğini keşfeder ve onun gerçekliği karşısında 
şaşkınlığa uğrarız. Bu duygu bizi bilinçli olarak sorduğumuz bazı sorulara yanıt aramaya doğru sürükler. 
Aynada yansılanan o yüz nedir? Bu, insanın karşısına çözmesi gereken bir varlık sorunu olarak dikilir. 
Bilinmeyen bir dilde yazılmış; okunaksız bir metin gibidir o; durmadan içine, derinliklerine döndüğümüz 
bir sırdır”. My Translation. 
9 “Le trait qu’on tire pour former le contour de quelque chose”. My translation 
10 “Le mot de portraire est un mot général qui s’étend à tout ce qu’on fait lorsqu’on veut tirer la 
resemblance de quelque chose; néamoins on ne l’emploie pas indifférement à toutes sortes de sujet. On 
dit le portait d’un homme, ou d’une femme, mais on ne dit pas le portrait d’un cheval, d’une maison ou 
d’un arbre. On dit la figure d’un cheval, la représentation d’une maison,la figure d’un arbre”My 
translation. 
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One of the main reasons for such a shift in the definition of portraire was not only the 
desire to make it a specific term of the artistic terminology, but also to relate the origins 
of portraiture to that of drawing and painting.  
 For André Bazin, the origins of painting and sculpture lie in the Egyptian and 
Greek traditions of preserving the human body in order to save it from the flow of 
time. The first Egyptian statue, the mummy, was a form of insurance against the 
passage of time and other representations such as terra-cotta statuettes put near the 
sarcophagus and the drawings of kings made on the walls of the Pyramids, might replace 
these bodies if they were destroyed. All these representations, which can be considered 
to be the first portraits, permitted, according to Bazin, the preservation of life by a 
representation of life (1967, 10). 
Similarly, there are many myths in Western culture that tell us how portraiture 
and painting were originally born from mankind’s desire to overcome death and 
separation. Raphael Pinset and Jules D’Aurioe in their book Histoire du Portrait en 
France, refer to a Greek myth which explains the origin of portraiture. According to 
this myth, the daughter of the potter Dibutade, from Sicyone, was separating from her 
fiancé who was leaving for the army, when suddenly under the gleam of the lamp, the 
silhouette of the man appeared on the wall and the girl had the idea of tracing his 
contours with the help of charcoal. Later on, Dibutade filled this contour with clay and 
made out of it a low relief in order to preserve forever the memory of the young man  
(1884,8). 
Eduard Pommier in his introduction to his book Théories du Portrait, points to 
the derivation of the same myth in other contexts, referring to one of the poems of 
Charles Perrault, entitled La Peinture. In this poem, Perrault also presents the 
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invention of painting as a reaction to separation, this time of a young shepherdess who 
will be separated from her lover (1986,22)11. 
However, the desire to keep a commemorative copy of oneself and of loved 
ones was not the only desire that motivated the art of portraiture. Portraiture was also 
seen as a technique that would provide an immediate depiction of the traits of a man, 
which could not possibly be given by words. The famous physiognomist J.C. Lavater 
points to this aspect of portraiture when he says:  
 
What is the art of Portrait Painting? It is the representation of a real 
individual, or part of his body only; it is the reproduction of an image; it is 
the art of presenting, on the first glance of an eye, the form of a man by 
traits, which it would be impossible to convey by words (Lavater quoted in 
Brilliant, 1991,35).  
 
It seems that, for Lavater, one singularity of portrait painting lie in its ability to 
represent a “real” individual, in its immediacy to vision, which is not comparable to a 
description in words. This immediacy can also create the impression that any visual 
portrait has the power of giving the beholder a more fixed and accurate image of the 
model’s appearance.  
However, although it seems that at the origins of painting and portraiture lies 
the desire to imprint one’s physical appearance in order to immortalise oneself or to 
give him/herself an immediate accessibility, later on, portraiture was conceived as 
more than an imprint, or a shadow of the human figure. According to Richard Brilliant, 
anyone who analyses the imagery of the portrait in Western art will discover that 
portraits are not merely recognisable faces and bodies, nor even likenesses. One 
                                                           
11 Eduard Pommier also refers to the gravures of Joachim Von Sandrart which illustrate these myths of 
the birth of painting (see Figure.2)  
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example from the 17th century, which 
shows how portraiture is not an 
imitation, is Luigi Miradori’s portrait of 
a child, Sigismondo Ponzone (Figure. 3).  
In this painting, the child captures our 
attention by holding in his hand a piece 
of paper on which is written: Padre, 
Che nel formarmi havesti parte 
prendimi hor riformato ancor 
dall’arte.12 Pommier argues that the ambiguity which characterises the art of portraiture 
is illustrated by this sentence because the portrait of Sigismondo Ponzone seems to 
oscillate between being a copy, a double of the child and being a reformation of him, in 
the sense of a transformation, transfiguration or even amelioration. For Pommier this 
painting illustrates one of the oldest debates around portraiture, which centers on the 
question of likeness. As he asks, “Is the portrait a virtuoso and thus deceptive copy of 
the model? Or the work of a creative power which is capable of separating itself from 
the real in order to correct and keep its model in accordance with its ideal vision?”13 
(1998, 27).  
Raphael Pinset and Jules D’Auriore ask a similar question concerning the 
relationship between the portrait and its model. They argue that although portraiture 
was seen as an inferior genre compared to other genres of painting, it nevertheless 
needed more effort in order to be successful, because unlike history or still life painters, 
                                                           
12 It is translated in Pommier as: “Pere, qui avez pris part a ma formation, prenez-moi maintenant, 
reformé encore par l’art.”(p.11) and which can be translated as: “Father, you who have taken part in my 
formation, take me now, reformed again by art.” 
13 “Le Portrait est-il copie virtuose, et donc trompeuse du model? Ou bien oeuvre d’un pouvoir créateur 
qui est capable de se détacher du réel pour le corriger et le rendre conforme à sa vision idéale?”My 
translation. 
Fig.3 
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the portraitist should give the glint of liveliness and intelligence to an immobile subject. 
In that sense, it is not sufficient for a portrait to be a physical resemblance conceived as 
a faithful reproduction of purely physical elements, as the portrait should also attain a 
moral resemblance. Pinset and D’Auriore ask in fact: “In which way would a painter 
who is content with this type of success (pure physical resemblance) differ from an agile 
craftsman or from a good drawing student whose well exercised hand excels at 
reproducing an ornament, or an academy? No, it is the moral resemblance one must 
reach. It is the entire man, which one must represent” (1884,5).14  
It seems thus that what makes a portrait successful is also its capacity to 
“represent” the moral resemblance, which is the resemblance of the portrait to the 
inner morality, the inner and invisible appearance of the model. A good portraitist is 
then the one who is capable of representing this invisible core, by using his insight and 
imagination.  
This idea that portraiture is an art rather than a copy of external features, was 
also widely held among some critics of the 19th century, as can be observed in 
Théophile Gautier’s text “Salon de 1859”. In this text, Gautier argues: “The painter 
should reveal the soul behind the mask of the face; he is set a higher goal, going beyond 
that which is merely individual to resume an entire period, an entire cast in a simple 
head standing out against an indeterminate background.” (Gautier quoted in Vaisse, 
1994, 120).  
In addition to all this, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s account of portraiture in his book 
Truth and Method emphasises the portrait as a representation in which the subject 
comes forth and is transformed. As observed by Nicholas Davey in his article “Sitting 
                                                           
14 “En quoi un peintre qui se contenterait de ce genre de succes (ressemblance purement physique) 
différerait-il sensiblement d’un habile ouvrier ou d’un bon éleve de dessin dont la main exercée excelle a 
reproduire un ornement ou une académie? Non c’est la ressemblance morale qu’il faut atteindre, c’est 
l’homme tout entier qu’il faut représenter”. My translation. 
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Uncomfortably: A Hermeneutic Reflection on Portraiture”, Gadamer is against 
relegating the artistic status of the portrait. For him portraiture is one of the most 
perfect manifestations of the function of art, that is, transforming and raising “reality” 
into its truth. He argues thus that a portrait is “…an intensification of what constitutes 
the essences of all pictures. Every picture is an increase of being and is essentially 
definable as representation, as coming to presentation” (Gadamer quoted in Davey, 
2003, 234). 
Up to now we have seen that the conception and definition of portraiture has 
changed historically. Portraiture has been considered both as an immortal “trace” of 
one’s appearance and as a representation that is always more than an imitation, 
requiring the touch of the artist to (re)present the totality (both inner and outer) of  its 
model. 
From these two main conceptions we can also deduce that portraiture is 
embedded within a paradox. On the one hand, portrait images, more than any other 
genre of visual representation, require an analogy between themselves and the person 
portrayed. The viewer of any portrait has a tendency, a desire to recognise and identify 
the model, as portraiture had always had this connotation of being a “trace” of a person 
and thus created a sense of certainty that it refers to “real” individuals. 
On the other hand, even though portraiture can aim to achieve a faithful 
likeness, this aim would not be possible if there were not an assumption of difference 
between the portrait image and the actual person. It is perhaps because of such a duality 
existing at the heart of portraiture, and because of the cultural ideals of the time that 
the portraitists of 17th century, such as Pieter Pauwel Rubens, Antony Van Dyck and 
the previously mentionned Luigi Miradori, believed that the power of a portrait does 
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not reside in its likeness to the model but rather in its capacity of elevating, 
ameliorating and transforming it. 
  Jean-Luc Nancy in his book Le Regard du Portrait brings another dimension to 
this paradox, by arguing that, although the singularity of portraiture lies in its being the 
only genre which has a well-determined aim, the likeness (resemblance) to the 
individual singularity, there is always an impossibility of recognition of this likeness, 
because, in order to recognise any subject of a portrait, we need to compare the 
portrait with its model at the very moment of contemplation. He argues that although 
the existence and identification of a model is necessary for making portraits, its 
recognition is not necessary for the art of portraiture. We can admire portraits without 
recognising them. 
 He also adds that although the aim of portraiture was to represent its model 
and unveil its essence, this unveiling is never an imitation but rather a production of a 
“subject”. In fact, for Nancy, pro-duire means in French, to bring to the surface, to take 
it outside, to expose, and in that sense portraits are not imitations but exposition/ 
production of their models.  
 Although this new argument about portraiture seems thus to focus on the 
limitations of considering the portrait as a mere copy of a human being, stressing that 
the act of portraying is also an act of pro-duction, there had however been a period in 
history where the nature of portraiture was again put into question by the proliferation 
of new techniques of “representation”. 
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2.2 Portraiture after photography 
If the invention of painting and portraiture 
is, as the myths would have it, motivated by 
a desire to conserve and thus immortalise 
the traits of a loved one, one can also note 
that the techniques and desires that lie at the 
origins of portraiture and painting seem to 
be similar to those that governed the origins 
of photography: the desire to imprint one’s 
appearance with the help of light. 
Two techniques of the late 18th century that precede the development of 
photography, Silhouette Portraiture, invented by Etienne de Silhouette and 
Physionotrace, invented by Gilles Louis Chretien, are based on the same idea of 
imprinting. The former required merely the ability to trace a cast shadow: a light 
source was placed in front of a subject, and the outline of the subject’s profile was 
traced onto a paper placed behind it (see Fig.4). The second technique was not so 
different from the first except with the advantage that the result was an engraved 
copper plate from which duplicates could be printed. Both of the techniques were 
popular with the growing middle class of the 18th century who on the one hand wanted 
the production of cheap portraits, which did not require any artistic training, and on the 
other hand, wanted their image to be infinitely duplicable. 
 These techniques, which were valued because of their being an imprint of their 
model, can also be considered as the testimony of a desire to have an “objective” 
representation of one’s self. It might thus be argued that when photography appeared 
around 1839, it was also the result of such a desire.  
Fig.4 
 24
At this point we might however ask why, if the desire for photography was already 
present before its invention, photography appeared so late and what is the particularity 
of the photographic image?  
Indeed, according to Geoffrey Batchen, who examines accounts of photography 
through a detailed analysis of the medium’s recent conception, as soon as we ask the 
question of the origin of photography we are faced with a mystery. Batchen in his book 
Burning with Desire cites Helmut Gernsheim who argues that the circumstances for 
inventing photography were already present before its invention: 
 
“Considering that knowledge of the chemical as well as the optical principles of 
photography was fairly widespread following Schulze’s experiment (in 1725)…the 
circumstance that photography was not invented earlier remains the greatest 
mystery in its history…It had apparently never occurred to any of the multitude of 
artists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who were in the habit of using 
the camera obscura, to try to fix its image permanently.” (Gernsheim quoted in 
Batchen, 1997, 24).  
 
In fact, long before the invention of photography, camera pictures were made in the 
Renaissance. In order to solve the perspective problems in visual representation, artists 
used the Camera Obscura (darkened room), described by Leonardo Da Vinci, as a 
mechanism where light enters in a minute hole of the darkened room and forms on the 
opposite wall an inverted image of whatever lies outside. In the 17th and 18th centuries 
the actual room grew smaller and a lens was fitted into one end of the box and the other 
end was covered with a sheet of frosted or ground glass so that the image cast on the 
ground by the lens could be seen outside of the camera.  
This machine which, according to André Bazin, was the first scientific and 
mechanical system of reproduction, creating the illusion of a three-dimensional space 
on a two-dimensional surface, became the standard equipment of artists. Francesco 
Algarotti in his essay “On Painting”, written in 1764, devotes a chapter to the Camera 
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Obscura and says: “The best modern painters among the Italians have availed themselves 
greatly of this contrivance; nor is it possible they should have otherwise represented 
things so much to life” (Algarotti quoted in Newhall 1964, 11).  
But it is with the discovery of the action of luminous rays on certain substances, 
notably salts of silver, the holides, sensitive to light, that photography differentiated 
itself from all other methods of “representation” by claiming to solve the problem of 
fixing and multiplying the image of the Camera Obscura. This discovery, which was first 
established by the German physicist Johann Heinrich Schulze in 1725, provided a way 
to trap the elusive image of the Camera Obscura.  
Later on, in 1839, the invention of two distinct photographic processes, the 
daguerreotype by Louis-Jacques-Mandé Daguerre and the negative/positive process by 
William Henry Fox Talbot, were almost simultaneously announced in France and 
England. Daguerre’s process produced an image on a silver-coated copper plate while 
Talbot’s was a paper based negative/positive process that could produce multiple prints 
from a single negative.  
Although the other techniques developed just before the invention of 
photography such as silhouette and physionotrace also permitted the multiplication of 
images, photography brought a greater freedom and precision to the images. It freed 
the image-making process from the manual intervention of the artist and thus added the 
sense that it partook of a more scientific character. 
  Indeed, Bazin points out that the photographic lens, which is considered to be 
the basis of photography, is called “objectif” in French, and the objectivity of the 
photographic camera comes, not from its ability to reproduce images but from its 
ability to form images with limited human intervention. For Bazin, photography, unlike 
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 other forms of visual “representation” that are based on the presence of man, seems to 
derive an advantage from its absence. The photographic camera seems thus to offer a 
more accurate and objective image, creating a feeling of certainty about the thing it 
captures.  
For Roland Barthes, this certainty that a photograph produces in us, is not a 
certainty in the sense of restoring what has been abolished by time or distance, nor in 
the sense of exactitude and perfect resemblance, (since the first photographic images 
lacked colour information and details), but rather in the sense of certifying that, what is 
seen on the photographic image has existed. For him photography cannot lie about the 
existence of its referent and it is this particularity which makes it also distinct from 
painting.  
Of course, as we have seen, painted portraits can also create in the beholder the 
feeling that they represent a “real” person. However, this impression becomes less 
secure if we consider the “artistic” 
touch of the painter on the image. 
What changed after the invention of 
photography is thus the reduction of 
this artistic touch and the tendency for 
photographs to be seen as “scientific” 
evidence, claiming an objective and 
accurate representation. As a result, 
photographic portraiture was not 
immediately seen as an artistic 
representation but rather conceived as 
an objective and scientific tool of recording.  Fig.5 
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One of those names who used portrait photography in the 19th century for his scientific 
purposes was Duchenne de Boulogne. He was one of the first photographers to use 
photography not for artistic portraiture but for illustrating his research on the electro-
physiological analysis of the human expression (Figure 5).   
Indeed, analysing the human expression and face in order to have access to the 
inner character of a human being, was an earlier desire, manifested in the proliferation 
of two scientific disciplines that emerged between the end of the 18th and the beginning 
of the 19th century: Physiognomy and Phrenology. Physiognomy, systematised by 
Johann Caspar Lavater, was a science seeking to isolate the profile and the various 
anatomic features of the head, such as forehead, eyes, ears, nose, chin, in order to have 
access to the individual character, while Phrenology, which emerged in the researches 
of the Viennese physician Franz Joesph Gall, sought to analyse the topography of the 
skull in order to reveal the correspondences between the skull and the mental faculties 
seated within the brain. Both of these scientific disciplines reduced an entire range of 
human diversity into specific categories. 
Allan Sekula, in his article “The Body and the Archive”, refers to the 
coincidence between the emergence of photographic practice and those disciplines that 
categorise, archive and control the individual body. For him, photography subverted 
the privileges inherent in portraiture. As a result photographic portraiture began to 
perform a role no painted portrait could have performed in the same fashion. This role 
did not come from the old honorific portrait tradition but from the imperatives of 
medical and anatomical illustration that established and delimited the terrain of the 
“other”. Sekula adds that photographic portraiture was a double system of 
representation, functioning  both honorifically and repressively.  
 28
On the one hand, photographic portraiture, unlike the traditional 17th-century 
portraiture that provided a ceremonial presentation of the bourgeois self, was 
popularised and extended to all realms of society. As a result it democratised the 
honorific functions of bourgeois portraiture. As quoted by Sekula, Jane Welsh Carlyle 
describes the inexpensive portrait photography as a social palliative: 
 
Blessed the inventor of photography. I set him even above the inventor of 
chloroform! It has given more positive pleasure to poor suffering humanity than 
anything that has been ‘cast up’ in my time- this art, by which even the poor can 
possess themselves of tolerable likenesses of their absent dear ones (Carlyle 
quoted in Sekula, 1989, 347). 
 
However, this usage of portraiture was not separated from its repressive use. Beginning 
as a cheap aesthetic pleasure, photography became later a utilitarian social machine 
which created a social archive, containing and creating the traces of the bodies of 
“betters” and “inferiors”, and thus providing a list of heroes, leaders, moral exemplars, 
celebrities, as well as of the poor, the diseased, the insane, the criminal, the non-white 
and the female. Those identities were created through different social institutions of the 
period and photographic camera played an important role in that process. 
Thus, as early as 1843-44, police departments all over Europe started to use 
photographs in research into criminality. Hugh Welsh Diamond was photographing the 
countenance of the insane in Great Britain. The ethnographer Louis Agassiz was having 
daguerreotypes taken of American slaves. And society portraitist André-Adolphe-
Eugene Disdéri was patenting his carte-de-visite. 15 
For Robert Sobieszek all these medical, psychiatric, 
anthropological/ethnographic, scopophilic and judiciary agendas of the period used 
                                                           
15 A pocket-sized card bearing a small and full-size photographic likeness in place of the person’s name.  
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portraiture to present the appearance of a certain individual or type, without the 
flattering or idealising goals of artistic portraiture. I want now to focus in more detail 
on this repressive aspect of photographic practice, through a close analysis of some 
photographs belonging to specific discourses of the late 19th and early 20th century, in 
order to delve later into an analysis of the act of posing and its ability to question this 
power of the photographic camera. 
2.3 The particularity of posing for photography 
Here is a photograph (Fig. 6) that is 
characterized by an unusual, frightening 
atmosphere, which makes the image hard to 
grasp. This frightening atmosphere mainly 
comes from the unexpected presence of the 
hand that seems both to hold and to control the 
head of the woman. The fact that the body 
belonging to the hand is left out of the frame 
makes the presence of the hand impersonal and 
even monstrous as this hand can also be seen metaphorically as a divine power, a divine 
hand coming from above.  
Moreover, what is also disturbing in this image is the indifference of the woman 
to what is going on. It seems as if she is not aware that her photograph is being taken 
since she maintains no communication with the camera. Together with her indifference 
one also gets the impression that she is controlled and can easily be manipulated by 
anything coming from the outside.  
                                                                                                                                                               
 
Fig.6 
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What creates this impression are the white hat and apron she is wearing and that make 
her look like a baby; her loose elbows and, her eyes directed downwards. Yet there is 
something that goes beyond that submission, something that seems uncontrollable. This 
thing that seems to escape any power is not easily describable. Perhaps it is related to 
the expression on her face. It seems that the muscles of her face are out of her control. 
The loosely hanging muscles of her cheeks, the half-open lips and her nearly closed 
eyes, make her face look like the face of a person who has some problem with 
controlling her facial muscles.  
In fact, if we check the title of this photograph we can see that it is from Henri 
Dagonet’s book (1876) entitled Nouveau Traité Elémentaire et Pratique des Maladies 
Mentales.16 It is thus one of those photographs used for the delineation of insanity. This 
woman could be a “mentally ill” person whose movements were fugitive and erratic so 
that an attendant was needed to hold her in order to prevent any movement that could 
cause blurs in the photograph. Because of her expression, which lacks any glimpse of 
consciousness and self-control, she also looks like a corpse. The hand holding her head 
increases this impression, as if she would fall back if the hand was not there.  
Without knowing the title of this photograph the whole scene could also easily 
be read as an attempt to take the picture of a dead person, known as post-mortem 
photography. Initially made to memorialise the dead as part of the mourning process, 
post-mortem pictures played an ambivalent role in the embodiment of death and its denial  
and they offered a last chance for the remaining family to record an image of the 
departed one. According to Hur Suhjung post-mortem photographers made every effort 
                                                           
16 The New Elementary and Practical Treatise of Mental Illnesses. My translation. 
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to make the death look "natural" or the dead seem agreeably alive, and this photograph 
could easily be seen as a continuation of that tradition17  
However, it is also obvious that the woman is not a dead person in the physical 
sense because her eyes still seem to look at something, though she might be considered 
dead in the symbolic sense because she seems completely under the control of the hand 
holding her head. 
Considering all these points, this photograph seems to illustrate some of the 
questions that Michel Foucault raises when he discusses the relationship between bodies 
and power. Does this image represent how power acts upon a body by at the same time 
crafting that body? Does it reveal the emergence of the complex strategic situation of  
19th-century western societies, where power is diffused into a micro-level, into the 
gestures, actions, discourses and practical knowledge of everyday lives?  
We may argue that the presence of the hand makes this photograph self-
reflexive because it points to or rather repeats the power of the photographic camera. 
In other words, the authority of the hand symbolises that of the camera. Both of them 
try to objectify and fix subjects through exposing, shaping, and controlling. Through 
this symbolisation this photograph shows the very process of how labels and identities, 
such as the label of being insane are produced by discourses that create régimes of truth.   
John Tagg in his book The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies 
and Histories argues that the evidential character of photography cannot be separated 
from the new practices of observation and record-keeping of late 18th- and early 19th- 
century European societies (1988, 78-81). These practices play an important role in the 
development of a network of disciplinary institutions such as the police, prisons, 
asylums, hospitals, departments of public health and schools, and they secrete new and 
                                                           
17 Hur, Suhjung. The Quickening of the Dead and the Dying of Death: Postmortem Photographs from 
 32
strategically connected discourses which function as tools of power producing new 
objects and identities. 
Tagg, referring to Michel Foucault, gives some examples of the effects of that 
new power, such as the reconstitution of homosexuality as illness in the medical and 
psychiatric analyses of the 1870’s, the discovery of  “mental illness” in the workings of 
the asylum and the evolution of the new pseudo-discourses of criminology. For 
Foucault this new type of power that is inseparable from knowledge is neither violence 
nor ideology, neither coercion nor consent, but rather a power situated at a different 
level, bearing directly and physically upon the body.  
As an example of this new power Tagg mentions how the development of 
photographic practice in England went hand in hand with the introduction and 
development of the police service in the country. With the realisation that photography 
could be an important tool for the purpose of identification, Central Criminal Record 
Offices and Regional Record Centres started to take standardised portraits of prisoners 
using specific lightings and settings shown in Figure 7.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Nineteenth,Century America. http:/imsc.usc.edu/haptics/LostandFound/abstracts_hur.html 12-06-2003. 
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This image consists of a strange series of photographs. First of all it is hard for the 
beholder to focus on the central figures, the prisoners, because of the mirrors put next 
to them in order to reflect their profiles. This coexistence of both frontal and profile 
view of a person in the same image creates a feeling of division that is repeated in the 
overall composition. The fact that all the photographs have the same composition, the 
same size and the fact that they are put together in a series, recreats the atmosphere of a 
prison:  prisoners are put into numbered cells, next to each other, gazed at by the 
guardians (the photographer and/or the camera) but unable to see each other.  
John Tagg argues that this kind of setting with the isolation of the body in a 
narrow space, its subjection to an unreturnable gaze, the sharpness of focus, the names 
Fig.7 
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and number boards, are the traces of power, repeated countless times whenever the 
photographer prepared an exposure, in police cell, prison, consultation room, asylum, 
or school (1988, 85). For him this repeated pattern in late-nineteenth-century 
photographic practice is another version of Foucault’s metaphor of the Panopticon.18 
The Panopticon was Jeremy Bentham’s plan for a model institution in which 
each space and level would be exposed to the view of another, establishing a perpetual 
chain of observations, which culminated in the central tower, itself open to public 
scrutiny. Foucault took this as a metaphor for a process of proliferating local tactics and 
techniques which operated in society on a micro-level seeking to produce the maximum 
effect for the minimum effort and manufacturing docile and utilisable bodies. The traces 
of such new techniques of observation is also inherent in the photographic practice of 
late 19th century as it is examplified in the previous photograph of the prisoners. 
If we return now to this series of photographs and try to analyse them in terms 
of their posing we can remark that what is common in all these photographs is that the 
poseurs are no longer submerged in the pose imposed on them. Rather, they look as if 
they are questioning the instructions and requirements of the photographer, with 
different expressions on their faces such as that of shock born perhaps out of fright, and 
they all seem unable to assume and/or appropriate a pose.  
Moreover, some of the prisoners look at the camera with a look of resistance. 
The man numbered 3496 and the woman numbered 4318 wear on their face the 
expression of someone who is trying not to lose his/her personality, who is trying to be  
 
                                                           
18 On Panopticon see Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp 200-9 
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strong and resisting as if they silently say: “You can capture my body but never my 
soul”.19  
What is surprising in all of these attitudes is that, despite the attempt of the 
police to classify, control, fix and expose the prisoners by imposing on them the same 
posture and by putting them into the same setting, each prisoner has a different, 
uncontrollable and often ambiguous facial expression in front of the camera.  
To all these inconsistencies, the ambiguity of the positioning of their hands is 
added. Although the purpose of making visible the hands was probably to give as many 
details as possible about the prisoner, these hands facing their chest may connote 
different things. They may, for example, make these prisoners look as if they are 
accepting their crimes, as if they want to say: “Yes, I am guilty; I am the one who 
committed that crime”. However, if we read this gesture of self-reference together 
with some of the facial expressions, such as that of number 965 or number 4448, 
another voice-over comes to mind: “Am I guilty? Me?”  
All these different narratives coming from the different meanings attributed to 
the hands and their gesture increase the ambiguity inherent in the poses of the 
prisoners. Although the aim of these photographs is to make the body of the prisoner an 
object, to make it docile, separated and individuated, to attach to it the identity of 
“prisoner”, they also reveal the impossibility of such an attempt by exhibiting the 
paradoxical reactions of the prisoners to this act of objectification.  
Even though these prisoners didn’t have any other choice than obedience; it 
seems thus that they can still escape from the effects of the power of the camera.   
                                                           
19 While analyzing these photographs I am obliged to refer to the prisoners through their classification 
numbers because the quality of the photographs does not permit me the read their names. This way of 
referring creates an effect of objectification that I will consider in more detail in pp. 37-40. 
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Before examining this possibility of escape in more detail, I want now to clarify how the 
photographic camera has a power that creates or produces a narrative of subjectivity. 
In the fourth chapter of her book, The Threshold of the Visible World, Kaja 
Silverman develops an argument about the separation of the camera from the eye and its 
subordination to the gaze. Following film theorists who argue against the reduction of 
the cinematic spectatorship to the identification of the spectator with the camera, and 
expanding Jonathan Crary’s argument about the discontinuity that exists between 
Camera Obscura and photographic camera, Silverman argues that the latter is not only 
separated from the eye but also displaces the eye from the seemingly privileged position 
it occupied in the Renaissance.  
For Silverman the camera is prosthetic rather than analogous to human vision. 
Departing from such a distinction, Silverman argues that because of its freedom from 
the imperfections of a human eye and because it is associated with true and objective 
vision, the camera has been installed ever since the 19th century as the primary trope 
through which the western subject apprehends the gaze. Departing from this 
association, she also argues that when a camera is trained upon us, “we feel ourselves 
subjectively constituted, as if the resulting photograph could somehow determine ‘who’ 
we are” (1996, 135). 
Moreover, while discussing the colonial deployment of the camera/gaze in the 
section “How to Face a Camera”, Silverman refers to the example of the identity 
photographs of Algerian women in Harun Farocki’s 1988 film, Images of the World and 
the Inscription of War. For Silverman the reason for the French colonial authorities to 
take “identity” pictures of Algerian women lies in their desire to be empowered and to 
rule, since to rule is to render “visible” and “legible”, she argues.  
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This power of the camera/gaze has some consequences for the subject facing the 
camera, and in the case of Algerian women Silverman mentions that there is “the horror 
of being photographed for the first time” (1996,148). Although this horror can be 
explained as the horror born out of a confrontation between two different cultures and 
the imposition of one cultural framework (the western framework of women as 
spectacle, for example) on the “other”, it can also exist in the moment of facing the 
camera in general, be it the first time or not. In fact, if we return to the photographs of 
the prisoners (Fig.7) we can see that most of the prisoners such as number 5499, 971 
and 4488, have on their face a trace of such a horror.  
Building on both Roland Barthes’ and Christian Metz’s argument that 
photography has the characteristic power both to preserve and to destroy the referent, 
Silverman points out that in the case of the subject’s relationship to the camera, the 
camera, like the gaze, has the power to provide the subject with a specular body, while 
at the same time abolishing his or her existential body. In this sense the photograph 
confers an identity upon the subject only at the expense of his or her “being”. Perhaps 
the horror that appears on the faces of the prisoners is the horror born out of the 
awareness of that loss of being.  
While examining previously the expressions of the prisoners in front of the 
camera we could also think about our own reactions, or feelings of insecurity, not only 
in front of a camera but also in front of any other technologies of objectification. Let’s 
think for example of the times when we go for a health check-up, put ourselves into the 
hands of doctors and focus particularly on the moment when they impose on us a 
difficult pose while taking our x-ray pictures. At this moment we can feel alien to 
ourselves.  
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On the one hand, we can try to obey the instructions of the doctors by holding our 
breath and by trying not to move. But on the other hand, we might feel clumsy because 
at that moment we are confronted with a strange apparatus that pushes us to reconsider 
our subjectivity.  
At that moment it is possible that we are reminded again of the full presence of 
our body, the body we are used to forgetting, to repressing in everyday life. We may 
feel that our body becomes an object of knowledge and to know it better we may try to 
see it from the perspective of the un-localisable eyes of the x-ray machine that oddly 
sees something we could never see (but yet can never feel and experience it, like we 
do). It is our bones. In front of that machine we can imagine what bones look like. We 
may be curious and impatient about seeing them, like small children who want to see 
their photograph as soon as their picture is taken.  
This act of impatience is perhaps the impatience of putting an end to the feeling 
of confusion, emptiness and pain, coming from a momentary loss of what we believe to 
be our subjectivity. This pain is mainly caused by the realisation of the impossibility of 
recognising our “self”, since the thing we used to call “ourselves” always incorporates 
something that we can never really grasp. Although we may desperately want to 
recognise ourselves in the x-ray picture, how can we recognise something we have 
never really seen before? Can we recognise our bones? We may thus realise that 
although our pose in front of the x-ray machine is for the purpose of clarifying our 
body’s condition, with the resulting image we will also be reduced to our bones, we 
will exist as bones for the doctors who will inspect our x-ray picture. We will exist as 
something we won’t be able to recognise.  
 39
The experience described above, although it belongs to a different realm from that of 
photography, may in some respect resemble the moment of posing in front of the 
photographic camera when we may also experience a similar anxiety and confusion. 
Indeed, such a moment of anxiety is very similar to Roland Barthes’ description 
of his own feelings in front of the camera. Having been the subject of photography 
many times in his life, Barthes reveals that posing in front of a camera is a moment of 
shifting impressions of oneself: “…the one I think I am, the one I want others to think I 
am, the one the photographer thinks I am, and the one he makes use of to exhibit his 
art” (1981,13). These impressions lead to another feeling that our image never 
coincides with our “self” because the image is heavy, motionless, and stubborn while 
our notion of our “self” is light, divided and dispersed. Whether in front of an x-ray 
machine or in front of camera, the moment of posing can thus be considered as a 
moment at which the subject is momentarily detached from what he/she believed to be 
him/ herself; when he/she questions his /her recognisability.  
This aspect of posing in front of a machine that is ready to objectify you was 
indeed more powerful in the early period of photographic practice because unlike in 
painting, posing was an inevitable part of early photographic practice. Because of the 
limitations of early photographic technologies in which the time of exposure could 
reach eight to ten minutes, posing was a necessity.  
Due to this, the models posing for photographs were also named “sitters” 
because it was necessary to keep the models immobile in order to obtain a non-blurred 
image. For this reason, the act of posing was much more important in photography than 
in painting. There were even some devices or prostheses invisible to the lens which 
supported and hold the body in its passage to immobility, such as headrests that would 
hold the head of the sitters from the back, so that they would remain steady. Posing was 
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not then a luxury and it reminded the sitter of the technological aspect of their picture 
being taken. As a result of this, the reactions of the sitters were different from those of 
the poseurs for paintings, because they were more directly exposed to the 
objectification of the camera.  
As we have seen, this objectification can occur at different levels. On the one 
hand, posing in front of the camera creates a moment suspension, a break in the 
continuity of everyday life in order to highlight a moment.  Even the French verb 
“poser” denotes the idea of “to put”, “to place”, or “to position” an object and thus 
reminds us the act of positioning, placing the sitter in front of the camera. 
 Moreover, if we consider that in order to take the first portrait photographs 
the subject had to assume long poses in photographic studios and was “statuefied” under 
the headrests, we can say that the moment of posing in front of the camera also turns 
the poseur into a museum object, the headrest becoming the pedestal.  
In addition to this, although there is always a person (namely the photographer or 
the operator) behind the photographic camera, this person’s stare does not generally 
meet with that of the model at the very moment of shooting. The camera can hide the 
face and the stare of the photographer, creating thus an uncanny combination between 
the photographer and his tool. This lack of communication between the photographer 
and the model may even be more dramatic if we consider that most of the time the 
photographer was not behind the apparatus but next to it at the moment of shooting. 
This would create in the sitter the impression that the photographer’s role was 
unimportant at the very moment that the picture was taken and that he/she was leaving 
the model alone with the camera, especially while he/she was forcing the model to look 
at the lens instead of him. Being face to face with a machine would thus create 
nervousness in the model.  
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Colin Ford, in fact, argues that in the early periods of photography, being photographed 
must have been a nerve-racking experience, and he adds that: “Cameras were large and 
awe-inspiring, and their operators had a disconcerting tendency periodically to 
disappear under a dark cloth in order to adjust the focus” (1983,11).  
Moreover, as also stated by Roland Barthes, photography also creates the feeling 
that the subject becomes an object at the disposal of others: others can have one’s 
photograph, can reproduce it, or print it in other objects such as books, and while 
doing so they make one’s image an object available for others. As a result of these two 
different levels of objectification, posing in front of the camera can create in the sitter a 
state of nervousness and can possibly push him/her to question this very moment of 
posing.  
Helen Humphrey, in her novel Afterimage, provides some descriptions of the 
moment of the pose in front of the early photographic camera as she tells us the story of 
a young woman photographer, Isabelle, who is a character inspired by the famous the 
late 19th- century woman photographer, Julia Margaret Cameron. While describing the 
state of the sitters in front of the camera, she explains the difficulty of maintaining a 
unified self and the anxiety of being objectified as follows: 
 
To be who we think we are. To look to someone else how we feel to 
ourselves. How hard that is to align. Cook’s sister might never have her 
photograph taken again. For people who don’t know her she will only ever 
be this stiff woman, her body so rigid in the photograph that there is 
nothing to read into it, into her. There’s no crooked elbow to suggest a 
casual ease with life, no chin tilted upwards to show interest in the world 
(2000, 78). 
 
I would like now to finish this chapter with an analysis of a photograph, belonging this 
time to another important discourse of western society, that of the family. Below is a 
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photograph by Charles Evans entitled Portrait of a Girl with Doll Holding Mother’s Hand. 
(Fig.8) 
 In this picture everything seems tranquil unless we see the hand holding the 
child. Not only is its being cropped disturbing but also its very existence in the image 
makes the child look as if she needed support while her picture is being taken. Probably 
the mother of the child was steadying and comforting her child for her portrait sitting 
which, as already mentioned, can be a very difficult and annoying moment if we 
consider not only the immobility required but also the strangeness for a child of being 
face to face with a machine.  
Is she capable of assuming a pose, or is she too disturbed or stiff to give a 
relaxed pose? She seems to obey the directions of either her mother or the 
photographer because in her face there is a trace of the seriousness of someone listening 
and trying to pay attention. Perhaps in this moment she was incapable of hiding herself 
behind a pose because posing needs 
also a certain self-confidence and an 
ability to adapt oneself to the pose. It 
is clear that she is not caught in an 
unexpected moment. She even seems 
to be too aware of the external forces 
that push her into her unnatural 
position. But neither is she totally in 
control of her external appearance. 
She rather looks as if she is 
questioning what is really happening at that moment. What gives us this feeling is her 
gaze (concentrated towards the left of the camera), which is that of someone who is 
Fig.8
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caught in between trusting and not trusting what she is facing. There is no grimace or 
any other trace of feeling on her face. She rather looks with an air of emptiness, as if she 
is questioning what is happening.  
In fact, “se poser”20 in French means also to raise a question to oneself, to 
address a question to oneself. In that sense posing may perhaps connote the moment in 
which the sitter, in his/her immobility may also raise questions about his/her own 
being exposed. This moment of questioning might be a moment of indecision between 
posing and refusing to pose, between believing in and forgetting our appearance, 
between trying to resemble what we believe to be our “self” and our awareness of its 
impossibility. It is perhaps in that moment of indecision caused both by the 
disruptiveness of the presence of the camera and its extensions (the flash, the headrest, 
the tripod etc), and by the indifference of the camera to our exposition that, we begin 
questioning our recognisability. 
Judith Butler, re-reading Foucault in “Bodies and Power Revisited”, argues that 
one’s fundamental attachment to oneself that passes via recognition is both engendered 
and constrained in advance by social norms. In a way, the subject is not recognisable 
without conforming to these norms. Can posing be a way to challenge those norms and 
to question the power of the photographic camera?  
Butler argues that Foucault’s concept of power is a form of power which 
categorises the individual and which imposes on him a law of truth, which he must 
recognise. For her, this formulation specifies the mechanism by which power acts on a 
subject and transforms a human being into a “subject”. Thus, power shapes and 
produces the subject by attaching it to its own identity through norms.  
                                                           
20 “Se poser” is the intransitive verb in French that can be used to define someone who is posing for 
his/her picture being made. However, it can also refer to the act of asking oneself a question, of raising 
a question. 
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However, Butler adds that the production of the “subject” is not the only effect of 
power. Power also produces as one of its effects a resistance to itself. 
The emergence of photographic practice in the late 19th century might be 
considered as one of these norms which produces new identities and, for Butler, to 
challenge the norms by which recognition is conferred is to risk one’s very being, one’s 
very recognisability. This implies that to question the norm is to suspend the satisfaction 
coming from the belief that we can be identical with that part of ourselves framed by 
the norms. She also argues that the moment of resistance, the moment of opposition, 
emerges when we question the promise of those norms that permit our recognisability.  
This chapter has tried to find some clues about the existence of such a pain, by 
focusing on the moment of posing during the early years of photographic practice, to 
argue that posing in front of the camera in an era when the camera was a powerful 
instrument that established the criterion of identity, may be one of those painful 
moments of (self-) questioning when the subject takes a critical distance on the terms 
that decides its very being. 
 Perhaps the little girl with her doll and the prisoners were all experiencing and 
revealing one of those moments where one has a chance, as Giorgio Agamben says, of 
facing one’s own face in its impropriety (2000, 97). The next chapter will try to analyse 
such a possibility from a psychoanalytical and philosophical perspective in order to 
consolidate the argument that the act of posing is a moment that questions, and 
uncannily shatters (self-) recognition. 
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My gaze slid by chance towards the 
massive mirror hanging in front of us 
and I uttered a cry: in this golden 
frame our image appeared like a 
painting and this painting was 
marvellously beautiful. It was so 
strange and so fantastic that a deep 
shiver seized me at the thought that its 
lines and its colours soon dissolve like 
a cloud. 
Leopold Sacher-Masoch, Venus in 
Furs 
 
Man cannot bear his portrait. The 
image of his limit and his own 
determination exasperates, panics 
him.21 
 
Paul Valéry, Notebooks 
 
Which body? We have several22 
 
Roland Barthes,  
The Pleasure of the Text 
3) Towards a theorisation of the act of posing 
 
“Is it possible to meet oneself?”(1991, 43). 
  
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen starts his article “The Statue Man” with this intriguing question, 
departing from Freud’s own account of his encounter with his own image in a reflection 
in the looking-glass of a wagon-lit compartment. He argues that at the moment of that 
encounter Freud failed in recognising his own image, his double, and took it to be a real 
person. The story that Borch-Jacobsen refers to is an anecdote from Freud’s famous 
article, “The Uncanny”: 
                                                           
21 “L’homme ne peut supporter son portrait. L’image de sa limite et de sa détermination propre 
l’exaspère, l’affole”. Paul Valery, Cahiers 1894-1914 Nicole Celeyrette-Pietri, Judith Robinson Valery, 
Gallimard : Paris, 1987. My Translation 
22 “Quel Corps? Nous en avons plusieurs”. Roland Barthes, Le Plaisir du Texte, Seuil :Paris, 1982.  
My Translation. 
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I was sitting alone in my wagon-lit compartment when a more than usually 
violent jolt of the train swung back the door of the adjoining washing-
cabinet, and an elderly gentleman in a dressing-grown and a travelling cap 
came in. I assumed that in leaving the washing-cabinet, which lay between 
the two compartments, he had taken the wrong direction and come into my 
compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the intention of putting him 
right, I at once realised to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my 
own reflection in the looking-glass on the open door. I can still recollect that 
I thoroughly disliked his appearance (Freud quoted in Jacobsen, 1991, 43). 
 
Jacobsen points out that what is happening in this encounter is not only a failure to 
recognise one’s own image but also a feeling of “dislike” born out of the uncanniness of 
facing one’s own image. He adds that nothing is more agonising and dislikeable than 
someone who resembles oneself. But why is facing our image so unbearable? What 
happens in this paradoxical relationship between our image/appearance and our “self”? 
 This chapter will try to find some answers to these questions by analysing the act of 
creating a self-image: the act of posing, from a psychoanalytical and philosophical 
perspective. But in order to delve into such an analysis let’s first give an account of our 
relationship with (self-) images. 
 
3.1 The subject and its image 
One’s first encounter with one’s visual appearance can be considered as one of the 
most crucial moments of human subjectivity, as for many psychoanalysts this 
encounter plays an important role in the formation of the ego. According to Jacques 
Lacan, the human child, as early as the age of six months, is able to relate to his own 
image reflected in the mirror in a more appropriative way than the chimpanzee, 
despite the fact that the chimpanzee is more advanced than him, in terms of 
instrumental intelligence.  
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Unable yet to walk or to stand up, the child is nevertheless able to relate to his own 
image in the mirror by fixing his attitude, his posture, in order to hold it in his gaze. 
For Lacan, this relationship brings forward a particular function of the image, that of 
establishing a relationship between the child and its surroundings, between the child’s 
fragmented uncoordinated inner sensation of his body and the outside, the surrounding 
world, between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt23.  
 Lacan gives the name of “the mirror stage” to this relationship and defines it as 
an identification, “a transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an 
image” (2, 1997). This transformation is a transformation from a fragmented bodily 
sensation to a “form” of its totality. Lacan calls the latter a “mirage” of a totality given 
to him as a Gestalt24, “an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent 
than constituted” (1997, 2).  
 Indeed, for Lacan the mirror stage is an important phase in the human ego’s 
development as he proposes that the ego comes into existence at the very moment 
when the infant grasps this Gestalt image of its body in the mirror. This observation 
about the formative aspect of the specular image emphasises the fact that the mirror 
image is sufficient to generate an apprehension of the self in the child.  
 However, this generation passes through a crucial paradox. As also stated in 
Kaja Silverman’s reading of Lacan in The Threshhold of the Visible World, Lacan 
paradoxically insists upon the coexistence of the “sameness” and the “otherness” of the 
mirror image within which the child finds or appropriates its “self”.  
                                                           
23 Lacan refers to these Freudian concepts in “The Mirror Stage” p.4. But he does not translate them. 
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen interprets them as the “organism” and its “reality”. I would rather interpret them 
as the subject’s “inner world” and its “environment”.  
24
 Form or shape. It also connotes the idea of unity. 
 48
On the one hand, the child experiences a méconnaissance25 in his encounter with his 
specular reflection, because he identifies with an image, an object outside of himself. 
On the other hand, what he sees when looking into the mirror is literally his “own” 
image. In other words, he is both directly related to but also different from his image.   
 I want to argue that this paradox might be related to a specific problematic 
within the discussion about the nature of the ego. From what exactly is the ego 
derived? From the body itself or from the representation/image of the body?  
 
3.2 The “self” in between body and image 
In “The Ego and the Id” Freud claims that the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego. 
Moreover, in accordance with his general attitude, he adds that the ego is not merely a 
surface entity but it is the “projection” of a surface. However, Silverman notes that 
despite Freud’s initial claim that the ego is derived from the body, Freud tends to 
separate the body and the psyche in his other works.   
 She also adds that Lacan insists more emphatically upon this disjunctive 
relationship, especially when he connects Freud’s conception of the ego as the 
“projection” of a “surface”, to his account of the ego as being specularly formed in the 
mirror stage.   
 This insistence by Lacan on the fictiveness and the exteriority of the image 
which forms the ego is nevertheless not sufficient according to Silverman because, 
unlike animals, the human subject is characterized by his ability to identify with his 
own image that is to “recognise” the image as the self.  That “belonging-to-me” aspect 
of our identification with the mirror image is indeed opposed to any other perception 
                                                           
25 Méconnaissance is a term frequently used in Lacan’s literature. It can be translated as mis-recognition. 
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of the mirror image, such as perceiving the image as just another member of the same 
species.   
 Silverman concentrates thus on the fact that, in order to appropriate the image 
reflected in the mirror, one must inevitably establish a relationship between one’s own 
bodily sensations and the image, which will always remain somehow outside them. 
Therefore the initial paradox that Lacan refers to points to the possibility that the ego 
takes its direction not only from its specular representation, but also from the 
“sensational” body. The subject, in order to appropriate the image in the mirror as 
his/her own, needs to pass through a convergence (matching) of his/her bodily 
sensations and the image he/she perceives in the mirror. In that sense bodily sensations 
play also an important role in the formation of the ego.  
 One psychoanalyst who emphasises the part played by the bodily sensations in 
the emergence of the ego is Paul Schilder. According to Silverman, in his book The 
Image and Appearance of the Human Body, Schilder recognises the importance of the 
image of the body in the formation of the “self”. However, he also adds that this image 
represents only one of the self’s components. Therefore the ego also has a corporeal 
aspect that Schilder calls the “postural model of the body” (Schilder quoted in 
Silverman, 12). It includes all tactile, cutaneous and kinaesthetic sensations that are 
experienced as pertaining to one body, graspable in totality.  For Schilder, the picture 
of our own body, which we form in our mind, is strongly related with these 
sensations, which are the impressions (such as thermal or pain impressions) that we 
experience with our body. 
  Moreover, he also adds that this experience of the form or totality of the body 
is conferred upon the subject from outside. It comes from a relationship between the 
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body and the world of objects. The form of the body can thus be perceived only if it 
comes into contact with surfaces other than itself. 
 Basing her argument on Schilder, Silverman emphasises that, like the specular 
image that forms the basis of the Lacanian ego, cutaneous sensation is conferred upon 
the subject from outside. She also stresses that for Schilder this perception of the 
corporeal ego by the subject is not simply the outcome of physical contact but is also 
shaped by the desires of the “other” addressed to it. 
  Schilder argues in fact that: “the touches of others, the interest others take in 
different parts of our body is not the simple product of physical contact, but it is also 
profoundly shaped by the desires which are addressed to it and by the values which are 
imprinted on it through touch” (Schilder quoted in Silverman, 13).  
 Departing from these accounts, Silverman concludes that one’s apprehension 
of the “self” is induced by both a visual image and by certain bodily feelings whose 
foundation is less physiological than social and therefore both visual and sensational 
perceptions are necessary for the formation of the sense of self. She thus points to a 
different approach to the Lacanian theory of the formation of the “I”, by emphasising 
the role of the bodily sensations and their inevitable relationship to the visual (mirror) 
image, in this formation. 
 Indeed, Silverman’s conclusion finds its roots in another psychoanalyst, Henri 
Wallon, who had already claimed a different interpretation of the ego’s development, 
before Lacan’s famous “The Mirror Stage”. In his, Les Origines du Charactere Chez 
l’Enfant (1934), Wallon puts forward a different theory of the mirror stage. He argues 
that a lengthy period intervenes between the child’s first introduction to the mirror 
and the moment he or she incorporates the image, whereas in Lacan, the infant’s 
confrontation with its specular reflection is punctual rather than an ongoing process.  
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As Silverman also points out, in Lacan’s narrative, the mirror image is sufficient to 
induce an apprehension of the “self” in the child. However, for Wallon, the visual 
image is always distinct from the sense of self that is more derived from a delicate 
combination of the corporeal ego and its visual projection. That’s why, in contrast to 
the Lacanian child who immediately misrecognizes himself as his image in front of the 
mirror, Wallon’s child embraces its reflection not as himself but as something other, a 
rival, or love object. As Silverman argues, Wallon’s exemplary children are either 
astonished when they touch the mirror image and come into contact with cold glass 
instead of warm flesh, or they prefer to look into the mirror image upon hearing their 
name, rather than responding to it.  
 All this suggest indeed that the infant responds to the reflection of its body as a 
separate thing or as something it can relate to (as in the example of the child who looks 
at the mirror when hearing his name called), but is never totally able to incorporate 
that image immediately.  
 Silverman adds that because of this lack of immediate recognition, the mirror 
image offers only an “identity-at-a-distance” (1996, 15). This “identity-at-a-distance” is 
not an identity in the sense of being the same but entails precisely the opposite, the 
condition or quality of being “other”. This opens up the possibility that the subject has 
access to himself by passing through the “otherness” within and/or outside the self, and 
this point will be elaborated later while discussing the act of posing in the section 3.3. 
 The mirror image or the visual image, in Wallon, represents what he calls the 
“exteroceptive ego” (1996, 14) but as we have seen, it is not the only component of 
the ego. There is also what he calls the “proprioceptive ego”, and for Wallon it is in 
relation to the proprioceptive ego that we are able to perceive the specular image as 
being “outside” us. Wallon’s “proprioceptive ego” is similar to Schilder’s corporeal ego 
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and I want now to focus in more detail on this particular aspect of the ego in order to 
relate the subject/image relationship to the act of posing. Because, as we will see, the 
act of posing is an act that is strongly related to the proprioceptive perception of the 
body.  
For Silverman proprioceptivity derives etymologically from two different sources 
proprius, which can mean “personal”, “individual”, “characteristic” and “belonging to”, 
and capere, meaning “to grasp”, “to conceive” and “to catch”. It thus generally implies 
“the apprehension on the part of the subject, of his/her ‘ownness’” (1996, 16). As we 
have seen above, for Silverman and Wallon, proprioceptivity is distinguished from 
identity that depends upon the image remaining always outside us. Silverman’s reading 
of Wallon emphasises proprioceptivity as being a non-visual mapping of the body’s form, 
and similar to Schilder’s sensational ego, the proprioceptive ego is also derived from the 
interaction between the body and its cultural environment.  
Moreover, Silverman stresses that the proprioceptive ego is not simply a 
deployment of musculature but it’s more of a posture (a position of the body, of bodily 
parts, or a characteristic way of bearing one's body: carriage), the body’s sensation of 
occupying a point in space, “a deployment of the body’s muscles for the purpose of 
fitting it…within an imagined spatial envelope” (1996, 16). Silverman adds, based on 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, that posture is a result of coercion induced for the 
benefit of work and education, such as the cultural manipulations which every child 
experiences in the process of learning to sit, stand, walk, etc. Posture is thus the 
manner of being, of behaving, that is culturally inscribed in every subject. But how can 
posture be inscribed on the subject? What is the role of the “image” (of the body) within 
this inscription? 
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For Wallon, although the “mapping” of the body is not merely visual, there is however 
a relationship between the proprioceptive ego and the exteroceptive ego.  The proprioceptive 
ego is not only the fragmented sensations related to the body, it is also an apprehension 
of the body that separates it from the immediate experience, and gives the body the 
impression of belonging to “me”, and this apprehension or appropriation, is only 
possible through an exteroceptive image.  
 As also noted by Borch-Jacobsen, for Wallon the “body” in general is the 
representation/idea of the body in the mind of the subject.  It is an “image” of the 
body. And Wallon adds that to perceive, define, our body, we need to separate it from 
everyday experience, as he argues: 
 
Between the immediate experience of things and their representation, a 
dissociation necessarily intervenes that detaches the qualities and existence 
proper to the object from the impressions and the actions in which it is initially 
implicated, by attributing to the object, among other traits, those of exteriority. 
Representation is only possible at that price. The representation of the body 
proper insofar as it exists, necessarily satisfies that condition and can be formed 
only through self-exteriorization…The whole work [of the child] therefore 
consists in the child’s giving himself images of himself” (Wallon quoted in Borch-
Jacobsen,1991, 47). 
 
Having a posture, posing, grasping the body in its totality, seem to be thus very much 
related with “imagining” that body, representing it as an image, and not as any kind of 
image but as a visual image.  The posture of the body is thus influenced by and even 
depends on the visual representation of the body in the mind of the subject. But more 
than that, a visual mapping of the physical sensations of the body is thus necessary to 
appropriate the body as the self. This imagination is a projection and it is inevitably 
necessary in the act of recognising, appropriating the visual reflection of the self on the 
mirror. 
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Indeed, Borch-Jacobsen’s comparative analysis of Freud, Lacan and Wallon leads us to 
an evaluation of Lacan’s “mirror stage” not as a stage per se, but rather as an ek-statis26 
that projects the ego before itself. As both Freud and Lacan state, a unity comparable to 
the ego does not exist from the beginning. Unlike animals, man is premature at birth, 
and if the ego projects itself before itself, it is because it does not have any unity, it does 
not hold itself upright. Therefore it can erect itself as a stable ego only through 
imaginary anticipation. As Borch-Jacobsen says: 
 
…the infant, delivered as he is into a sort of primordial “dehiscence”27 anticipates 
his bodily unity and mastery in an image…in this sense the unity of the ego is 
fundamentally imaginary-that is both fundamentally illusory…and fundamentally 
visual. Indeed only through vision, can the ego arise itself before itself as a self –
enclosed totality. The erection of the ego is always the erection of a statue that I 
see over there- triumphant, unshakeable, fixed for eternity (1991, 49). 
 
 
Borch-Jacobsen starts pointing here to Lacan’s connection with the speculative 
dialectics of Hegel. He also confirms this connection in the following paragraph, by 
saying: “Indeed that there is no ‘possible representation’ except at the price of an initial 
‘exteriorisation’ and of dissociation from ‘immediate experience’-isn’t this what Hegel 
says of the Absolute and its ‘reflection in the otherness within itself?’” (1991, 50). 
 He also states later on: “Nothing is less ‘speculative’ in the Hegelian sense than 
the ‘precipitation’ that ‘forever’ stops, fixes and blocks the ego in the form in which it 
fictitiously anticipates itself” (1991, 51).  
 From all this we can see that Borch-Jacobsen pays extended attention to the 
traces of speculative ontology in Lacan’s text and he argues that, despite Lacan’s desire 
to criticise the Cartesian conception of the subject (since Lacan declares at the 
                                                           
26 Borch-Jacobsen refers here to Heidegger’s vocabulary. Ekstasis is the Greek word from which the 
English word ecstasy is derived. It means to be outside oneself. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ekstasis 
27 Spontaneous opening burst. 
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beginning of “The Mirror Stage” article that the formation of the ego [“I”] is an 
experience “ that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the Cogito” 
[1977,1]), the mirror stage prolongs and even completes this philosophy by exhibiting 
one of its major presuppositions in broad daylight.  
 In fact, what “The Mirror Stage” suggests is that the ego is outside itself from 
the very beginning, always already represented and ex-posed in front of itself, and the 
subject is conceived in terms of vision. That is for Borch-Jacobsen what lies at the heart 
of the modern metaphysics of “subject(iv)ity”28 as it seems that the Lacanian “subject” is 
nothing other than the Cartesian “subject” whose evidence comes from  “posing-oneself- 
before oneself” (1991, 55).  
 For Borch-Jacobsen, the Cartesian Cogito, supposes from the very beginning a 
spacing of the “before-oneself” and he adds that the metaphysics of subjectivity bases 
itself on the self-evidence of the self (ego) which can only grasp and see itself from a 
distance. He also adds that: “The Lacanian ego is the ego as it theorises itself, never as it 
feels ‘itself’ or experiences ‘itself’” (1991,57).  
 So, we can say that the proprioceptive mapping of the self is dependent on the 
projection of the exteroceptive image on the body because it is through that projection 
that the body and the “self” become separated from everyday experience and thus can 
be represented, thought and conceived as a Gestalt. Posture is one of the outcomes of 
such a projection as it is one of the ways a certain image, gesture, or pose is inscribed 
on the body.  
 Up to now we have seen that (self-)identification, (self-)recognition requires 
not only an encounter with our (mirror) image but also an incorporation of that image. 
Therefore the subject’s bodily experiences and corporeal sensations are also crucial in 
                                                           
28 Borch-Jacobsen’s emphasis. 
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that identification, as there is an unavoidable relationship between the proprioceptive and 
the exteroceptive identification of the self.  
 We have also seen that any incorporation of the (self-)image necessitates a 
projection of a mental image of the body’s totality, a posing oneself-before-oneself, that 
is also a distanciation from the self, a separation of the self from its immediate 
experience and even perhaps, in my interpretation, a becoming “other” to the “self”. 
Let’s see now how this separation/distanciation brings with it the possibility of 
questioning/shattering the very act of (self-)identification and (self-) recognition which, 
I hope to show, reveals itself perfectly in the act of posing.   
  
3.3 Posing  
In its simplest sense, posing can be considered as the way in which the “subject” 
responds to the (implied) presence of the beholder. It is, assuming a posture, an 
imaginary self, in front of any captivating gaze. It can thus be considered as a re-
presentation, an attempt of (re)formation of the “subject”, like in the mirror stage.  
   When in front of the photographic camera (which, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, can be considered another form of the gaze), posing can be seen as a 
response to and defence against the camera’s “deadly” capture. The camera has indeed 
been considered since its invention as a tool which “shoots” (as we say “shooting” to 
mean taking a photograph) the subject and “kills” him/her in the sense that it turns 
him/her into a frozen image, an object available for others. In other words, the 
photographic camera was believed to be an apparatus that claims a power over the 
subject it shoots, in the sense that, it turns him/her into an image over which the 
subject has no control.  It also creates in the subject the feeling of being “constituted” 
and (re)formed as we already mentioned in more detail in the previous chapter. As a 
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result, the act of posing in front of the camera can be considered a protective response 
against the camera’s “gaze”.  
Indeed, for Craig Owens, posing is also an act of self-protection in the sense 
that the posing subject seems to “kill” himself before being “killed” by the camera, as 
he/she becomes a frozen image. Similarly, Roland Barthes, who extends the pose to 
inanimate things, describes it as an “instant, however brief, in which a real thing 
happened to be motionless in front of the eye” (Barthes quoted in Owens, 210).  
It seems thus that the act of posing is a perfect example of the subject 
apprehending and/or protecting itself by transforming itself into a frozen image, 
imitating, projecting, the image he/she has in his/her mind, on his/her body. It is a 
moment of becoming an “image”.  
Moreover, by referring to Lacan, Owens argues that there is a splitting that the 
subject experiences during his/her pose. This splitting occurs because there is 
separation of the “self” from everyday life’s continuous flow. In other words, the 
subject is split because its body becomes a picture, a semblance, a “separated” image, in 
order to perform beforehand what the photographic camera will do to him/her that is, 
condemning him/her to death. He also adds that this “separation” connotes both the 
idea of dressing oneself, but also the idea of defending oneself, (to provide oneself with 
what one needs to be on one’s guard) and, the idea of being engendered29. 
  In short, for Owens, posing is a protective response to the camera/gaze that 
both punctuates (arrests, suspends) and punctures (pricks, wounds) the “subject”. So, if  
in posing for a photograph the “subject” freezes, it is not in order to assist the 
                                                           
29 “To separate” comes from Latin separat-, the past participle of separare, which is formed from the 
prefix se- "without, apart" and parare “make ready", "prepare something by parting it from something 
else" - pretty much what we mean by the verb to pare.  We first encounter separate in written English 
in the early 15th century.  The Indo-European root of parare  is  pere- which can mean, "to produce, 
procure", and “to protect” which also gave us the words like parade, parachute, parasol, pare etc. 
(http://www.takeourword.com/TOW182/page2.html) 
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photographer and/or the camera but in some sense to resist him, to protect itself from 
his immobilising, deadly gaze by becoming a frozen, “dead” image before being 
captured. And he calls this act an arrêt de mort30. Owens points out that Arrêt de mort 
means in French both a death sentence and a stay of execution. In that sense the posing 
subject seems paradoxically to condemn him/herself to death and at the same time 
wards off death by an ambivalent forestalling. Owens asks: “What do I do when I pose 
for a photograph? I freeze…as if anticipating the still I am about to become; mimicking 
its opacity, its stillness; inscribing, across the surface of my body, photography’s 
‘mortification’ of the flesh” (1992, 210).  
 Silverman offers a similar account of the pose when she claims that posing is 
not simply imitative of a pre-existing image, but rather, it is imitative of photography 
itself, as she says that the pose does not only arrest the body, “hyperbolising the 
devitalising effects of all photographic representation” (1996, 202), but also resembles 
three-dimensional photography. She also adds that it is the assimilation of proprioceptivity 
to exteroceptivity, corporeality to image.  
Moreover, Silverman argues that in the field of vision the subject does not 
passively wait for the camera/gaze to photograph him or her. On the contrary he/she 
“may give him or herself to be apprehended by the gaze in a certain way, by assuming 
the shape of… a desired representation” (1996, 201). When this happens, the subject 
tries to anticipate the imaginary photograph by approximating its form. In other words, 
the posing subject “performs” the photograph (especially its stillness) he/she will be 
into, before-hand. It is in this sense that it resembles three-dimensional photography.  
                                                           
30 He takes this term from Jacques Derrida’s terminology in “Living on border lines” in Deconstruction 
and Criticism , trans James Hulbert, ed. Harold Bloom, New York:The SeaBurry Press, 1979, pp.75-
176. 
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Considering these accounts of the act of posing we can argue that posing is not an 
imitation of a specific image. Rather it is a re-enactment of some qualities pertaining to 
photography. Moreover, Silverman argues that if posing resembles anything it 
resembles mimicry, and mimicry is not a simple imitation. 
Silverman refers to Jacques Lacan’s description of the phenomenon of mimicry 
in his Four Fundamental Concepts of Pyschoanalysis and argues that for Lacan, although 
mimicry is a behaviour found in certain species of insects, which seem to adopt the 
shape, and the natural colour of their environment for protective reasons, it is more an 
attempt to become part of a particular picture rather than an attempt to imitate a pre-
existing image.  
Basing his argument on Roger Callois’s Méduse et Compagnie, Lacan argues 
that mimicry can be considered a behaviour in which the being gives of him/herself 
(and receives from outside) something that is like a mask, an envelope, a thrown-off 
skin, to frame its shield. However, this behaviour does not serve merely a protective 
function.  
 Lacan, by referring to Callois (who specifically analyses the crustacean called 
“caprella”, living among the “quasi-plant animal” known as briozaires), remarks that 
the caprella imitates the briozaires’s intestinal loop, but it fails to deceive its predators. 
He adds that, the caprella’s disguise represents rather an attempt to become part of a 
particular “picture”.  
 In fact, Callois in his paper “Mimicry and Legendary Psychastenia” also argues 
that the function of mimicry in the insect is not to ensure the survival of the species 
through camouflage because most predators rely on the sense of smell rather than 
visuality.  
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Moreover, according to Elizabeth Grosz, who observes the relationship of body and 
space in her article “Lived Spatiality (The Spaces of Corporeal Desire)", Callois also 
likens the insect’s ability to mimic its environment to a psychosis that Pierre Janet 
describes as “legendary psychastenia”, which is a psychosis in which subjects are unable 
to locate themselves in position in space, where the subject is no longer the origin of 
his coordinates, and thus he/she cannot know where to place him/herself. In addition 
to this, the subject is dispossessed of its privileged connection between his/her 
consciousness and a particular point in space. In other words, the condition under 
which the subject has a perspective on the world and on himself is collapsed. Grosz 
adds that, in that case, the subject “feels himself becoming space” (1993, 192).  
 In accordance with this account, Silverman points out with reference to 
Wilem Flusser’s Towards a Philosophy of Photography, that mimicry is “a 
reproduction in three-dimensional space with solids and voids: sculpture-photography” 
(Flusser quoted in Silverman, 201). What is significant in all these accounts is that, if 
we consider posing as a form of mimicry we can argue that while posing, the subject is 
not really imitating. Rather he/she is threatened by a loss of the sense of self and 
he/she mimics the stillness of photography.  
Moreover, in some other contexts mimicry is conceived as a form of framing 
and defending the self but at the same time collapsing, shattering its totality. While 
writing on mimicry in colonial discourse, Homi Bhabha tends to identify mimicry as 
one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge.  By 
this, he means that defining the colonised “other” as “a subject of difference that is 
almost the same but not quite” 31 (he gives the example of difference between the 
                                                           
31 In Homi Bhabha “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse” 
http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/wyrick/DEBCLASS/bhab.htm p.4 
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Anglicised and the English), is a manner of appropriating this “other” in a way that 
recognises it only partially. He reveals that mimicry is the representation of a difference 
in such a way that it disrupts the initial authority. But it is only through such mimicry 
that the coloniser can endure its power and secure its own identity. In that sense Bhabha 
argues that mimicry is a "metonymy of presence". It is a strategy of authority in colonial 
discourse as it rearticulates presence, in terms of its “otherness”. 
Departing from this account we can argue that mimicry seems to be a form of 
defence in the sense that it can be a form of defending oneself, by appropriating the 
"other", the unknown. It is a defence against the disappearance, against the non-
existence of the "other", where one defines oneself by defending and differentiating 
oneself against the "other". This defence is a form of existence, a form of presence, 
which depends on the existence of a displaced and appropriated "other". Mimicry is 
thus a form of framing, which can frame and secure one’s identity and power. But it has 
at the same time the potential to disrupt its totality, its unity and continuity by 
reminding us that it is inevitably based on a certain splitting and difference. 
Departing from all these accounts we can argue that the posing subject seems to 
experience a similar experience to that which he/she experiences in front of the 
mirror. Posing seems to be strongly related to a splitting of the subject in between his 
image and his “self”, both to re-generate oneself and to protect oneself from the 
captivating gaze of the camera. This splitting of the “subject”, as we have seen, seems to 
be for Lacan the necessary condition of becoming a “subject”.  
But there is also one big difference between the act of posing and the act of 
contemplating the self in front of the mirror. When we pose (in front of the camera) 
we can never “see” ourselves. We cannot confirm or appropriate our image as we do 
with our mirror image. Unlike the experience in front of the mirror, we cannot see the 
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end result of our pose immediately. It is perhaps because of this that some people might 
impatiently want to see their own photograph after posing. Perhaps we want to feel 
ourselves completed after encountering our photograph. The pose can thus be seen as a 
proprioceptive sensation, separated from its exteroceptive component.  
The fact that there is such a potential gap between the exteroceptive and 
proprioceptive at the moment of the pose may perhaps reveal the possibility that, despite 
all the classical accounts of the act of posing (that seem to focus on its potential to frame 
the subject, be it in the form of affirming or protecting the self), the act of posing can 
be conceived as a moment that puts into question this very framing of the “subject”. 
Thus, although posing, like self-recognition in the mirror stage, can be 
considered an assimilation, an over-layering of the exteroceptive onto proprioceptive 
perceptions of the self, the fact that the gap between those two perceptions can be felt 
and experienced more dramatically in the moment of the pose, may give us some 
opportunity to reconsider the act of posing as a moment that renders (self-) recognition 
impossible. 
Perhaps it is possible to argue that while posing, the poseur cannot finish/affirm 
his/her (self-)identification? Perhaps there is an endless deferral of the self at that 
moment? In order to focus on such a possibility I want now to go into another analysis 
of the act of (self-)identification and/or posing, basing my argument on Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s effective questioning of the notion of identification through his 
reading of Urs Lüthi’s photographic (self-) portraits. 
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3.4 Questioning (self-) identification and/or (self-) recognition 
In order to reveal the mechanism of identification and resemblance, Lacoue-Labarthe 
starts with an essential question that will not only provide some insights into the nature 
of art, but will also offer a challenging account of the relationship between the subject 
and its image by basing his argument on photography. This question is: “Can art identify 
itself?”  
For Lacoue-Labarthe, this is a question endlessly asked by art itself. In his book 
Le Portrait de L’Artiste en Général32, he opens up this question by departing from a 
comparison between art and photography and thus by returning to the classical debate 
about the place of photography within the artistic realm.  To do this, he departs from a 
series of nine photographic self-portraits of Urs Lüthi exhibited by the Stadler Gallery 
in Paris in 1974, and embedded in between the nine chapters of Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
book.  
This work (see figure 9) entitled Just Another Story About Leaving, consists of a 
succession of nine photographs of Lüthi in which we see on the one hand a progressive 
degradation, growing old, of Lüthi’s face, and on the other hand some photographs 
belonging to different places, (an interior, a tree-lined road etc.), all giving the 
impression of being connected with the portraits since they are juxtaposed to them. 
Indeed, these photographs are nearly all blurred, which gives the impression that they 
are taken during a movement, perhaps the movement of leaving. 
 In his facial degradation, Lüthi seems also to play on the signs of sexual 
difference by showing us an oscillation between his feminine and masculine sides. 
Indeed, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Urs Lüthi is an artist who is catalogued in the 
margins of “corporeal art”, among the transvestites.  
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For Lacoue-Labarthe “Just another story about leaving” is indeed “another” story about 
leaving (in the sense of dying). But it is also a story of life, about living. But what is 
exactly happening in these self-portraits? What might be the relationships of these 
photographs or of photography itself, with the problematic of identification and the 
pose? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
32 The Portrait of the Artist in General. Lacoue-Labarthe quotes this title from Baudlaire’s autobiographical 
fragments Mon Coeur mise a nu. 
Figure 9 
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Lacoue-Labarthe starts his analysis by emphasising that if we follow these photographs 
linearly we can see a transformation in the face of Lüthi (a transformation that is made 
possible with make-up). There is indeed a transformation happening in these 
photographs at two levels.  
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First of all, we can see that Lüthi plays with the traces of masculinity and femininity on 
his face. In the first photograph, for example, we can recognise him as a male subject 
but we can also see some female characteristics on his face, and as we follow the 
photographs, we might fall into doubt about the nature of his sex. 
 Secondly, these photographs are not only the mimicry of becoming 
(simultaneously?) male and female but they also represent a mimicry of becoming old as 
we see that towards the end of the series, Lüthi’s face degrades and becomes old. For 
Lacoue-Labarthe, at first sight, this work can be considered as a projection by Lüthi of 
his history. It is an anticipation, an imagination of his becoming old. 
But the important thing here is that, through this degradation there’s an 
oscillation between differences (young/old, masculine/feminine). As Lacoue-Labarthe 
observes: “ …la ‘dégradation’ donc, qui dans un premier temps, masculinise (ou re-
masculinise) le visage, à la fin, par on ne sait quel rotation interne immobile…laisse 
transparaitre aussi le visage d’une vielle femme, laquelle comme certaines vielles 
femmes en effet, aurait quelque chose de masculin” 33 (1979, 37). 
Lacoue-Labarthe argues later on that, on the eve of death, the history in 
appearance stops in time and the face of the “other” becomes to resurgent but there is 
no way to decide which “other” it is. By this, he means that when one approaches one’s 
own death, the “other” appears on one’s face. Referring to Lüthi’s photographic self-
portraits he argues indeed that in these portraits, any possibility of resemblance 
collapses because Lüthi’s face becomes an image only identical to itself. Like Blanchot’s 
corpse, it becomes free from the “figure” (we cannot figure out whether he is male or 
female, for example). 
                                                           
33 …the degradation thus, which, at first masculinises  (or re-masculinises) the face, at the end lets also 
appear the face of an old woman who, like some old women in fact, has something masculine. 
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For Lacoue-Labarthe, in this history of Lüthi’s face, we see the degradation of the 
monumental, the collapse of the “type”, and the effacement of the epitaph. The death 
thus, does not sanction, which means that neither life, nor death; neither masculinity, 
nor femininity can be deciphered in these photographs because there is an oscillation 
between the same, and self-same (auto), which troubles the stable, fixed and assured 
separation between the presence and the absence; between the masculine and the 
feminine; between the lively and the lifeless. 
 Together with this analysis, Lacoue-Labarte draws our attention to the epigraph 
of these photographs: You are not the only one who is lonely. For him this sentence, (which 
can be considered as Lüthi’s signature) summarises in a way the whole problematic of 
the project that can be formulated as follows. 
On the one hand, such a (performative) usage of photography in Lüthi’s work 
makes us doubt the very claim of photography (the use value assigned to it, according to 
which it may be, documentary, mnemonic, illustrative, testimonial etc.). On the other 
hand, this project reveals that it is not always possible in the reproduction (from 
illustration to duplication) of the evoked subject, for identification can be guaranteed 
between the signifier and the signified.  
He adds: “C’est pourquoi, il est vrai, vous (qui?) n’êtes pas le seul à être seul, 
c’est-à-dire a courir le risque de ne plus pouvoir ‘vous’ reconnaître, si dans la solitude 
‘essentielle’, comme dit Blanchot, ‘la dissimulation tend à apparaître’”(1979, 24)34. In 
other words, for Lacoue-Labarthe, Lüthi addresses the spectator with this sentence and 
says in a way that “you are not the one who is lonely in not recognising yourself”. He 
thus points to the impossibility of (self-)recognition in general.  
                                                           
34 That’s why it is true that you (who?) are not the only one who is lonely which means that you are not 
the only one to take the risk of not being able to recognise yourself, if in absolute solitude as Blanchot 
says, “the dissimulation tends to appear.  
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In other words, Lüthi’s self-portraits not only put into question the very possibility of 
the self-portrait (can we really recognise ourselves/others in our/their self-portraits?) 
but also problematise (self-)identification itself by also putting into question the 
assumed objective and duplicative character of photography.  
Moreover, in these photographs, Lüthi seems to perform his self-portrait in 
such a way that he explores the capacity of the self-portrait to foreground the “I” as 
“other” to itself, in the sense that it always escapes from itself. While doing this, he also 
uses and questions (at the same time) the desire of photography to capture, to maintain 
the past in the present, to freeze its subject. These photographs, instead of delivering us 
an image confirming our unmediated access to the “authentic” (if there is such a thing) 
meaning of the subject (Lüthi’s sexual identity for example), reveal the impossibility of 
attaining such access. I want to argue that the act of posing is also one of those moments 
that reveal the impossibility of attaining such a fixed, secured access to the self because 
it is a moment that also reveals an oscillation, a splitting of the subject caught in 
between incorporating and not incorporating his/her (exteroceptive) image, between 
recognising and becoming “other” to the self. 
Amelia Jones, in her article “The ‘Eternal Return’: Self-Portrait Photography as 
a Technology of Embodiment”, defines the act of posing (for the photographic camera) 
as an act which predicates a freezing of bodily motion where a death of the subject is 
enacted. However, she also argues through an analysis of self-portrait photographs of 
contemporary artists such as Cindy Sherman and Hannah Wilke, that, although posing 
represents an immobility projected onto the past (in Barthesian terms), this immobility 
“can after all be transformed into a sign of eternal life…sustained via deferral through 
the other” (2002, 956). A few paragraphs later she also adds: “…the performative 
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posing of the self, whether photographically documented or “live” is always already a 
performance of the other” (2002, 965).  
As Lacoue-Labarthe also observed through Lüthi’s photographs, Lüthi’s (self-) 
performance or pose defers his identity through an oscillation of the “other” within the 
self. That is what he calls the “allo-portrait” that is, the presence of the self as “other”, 
both as personne35 (in the sense of no one) and as the “other” that is externally given to be 
recognised. This concept of Lacoue-Labarthe’s will be given more detailed 
consideration in my last chapter. But for now I want to end this section by returning to 
my starting point, claiming that this deferral of the “I” is the reason why the subject feels 
so uncanny about encountering/ (mis-)recognising his “self”.  
We have seen throughout this chapter that the act of posing is a very 
paradoxical act, uncannily disturbing the myth of the “subject”. On the one hand, it is 
an act which is suspended between a bodily sensation of the self and its scopic 
projection but hardly permitting the subject totally to reach the plenitude that he/she 
seems momentarily to reach in the mirror stage.  On the other hand, the act of posing 
has the potential to reveal the otherness within the “I”, not to confirm it or to 
appropriate it, but to defer the “I” to the point of preventing its recognition. 
Although Lacoue-Labarthe is cautious about recognising in this process the 
uncanny, (as he says: “il ne faut pas se précipiter, tout d’abord, à‘identifier” là le sacro-
saint Unheimliche-pour le rabattre aussitôt, comme de juste sur la non moins sacro-sainte 
castration” [1979, 49]. )36, I still want to end this chapter by attempting to answer the 
question that Freud’s quotation opens up at the very beginning: why is encountering 
our image (which we saw in this chapter, is not necessarily an encounter with our actual 
                                                           
35 This is itself a paradoxical term meaning both “person” and “no one” in French.  
36 One should not hasten, first of all, to “identify” it with the sacrosanct Unheimliche for folding it back at 
once, on the not less sacrosanct castration. 
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image in the mirror but may be our encounter with our “imagined” self during the 
moment of the pose) so unbearably uncanny? My answer to this question is: because the 
uncanny is not only an anxiety born out of facing the unfamiliar and/or the return of 
the repressed but is also related to the impossibility of representation. 
 
3.5 The pose as an uncanny relationship of the self to its image37 
The classical Freudian conception of the term “uncanny” bases itself on two lines of 
argument. Freud, in his famous essay “The Uncanny”, starts first by analysing the 
complex definition of the German word das Unheimliche, translated as uncanny but 
literally meaning unhomely. In fact, although unhomely is the opposite of what is 
familiar and homely, the term “uncanny” for Freud is not simply what is unfamiliar and 
this is due partly to the ambiguity of the term das Heimliche (the homely).  
Basing himself on two nineteenth-century German dictionaries, Freud 
demonstrated that “among its different shades of meaning, the word ‘heimlich’ exhibits 
one, which is identical with its opposite, ‘unheimlich’” (1955, 17). On the one hand, 
heimlich is related to what is familiar and agreeable and, on the other, to what is 
concealed and kept out of sight, such as the unheimlich, since unheimlich can also 
include everything that ought to remain secret and hidden but has come to light. 
 Bearing this in mind, Freud argues that unheimlich can be considered as a sub-
species of heimlich because there is an inevitable inclusion of the unfamiliar in the 
familiar, or rather the unfolding of the homely into the unhomely. The uncanny isn’t 
thus something new or foreign but something familiar or well established, estranged by 
the process of repression.  
                                                           
37 Parts of this section are inspired by a previously unpublished work of mine entitled Composition and 
The Uncanny: A Methodological Account of  Composition in Visual Arts, and submitted as an MFA 
Thesis to the Institute of Fine Arts, Bilkent University, 2001. 
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In fact, Freud draws on E.T.A.Hoffman’s story “The Sandman” to relate the 
uncanniness of the story to the return of the repressed castration anxiety and to the 
question of the double. In this story the figure of the Sandman plays an important role. 
This figure that reappears at key moments in the story is highly ambiguous. He is 
originally a dreadful character that comes to children when they won’t go bed, in order 
to throw sand in their eyes so that they will leap from their sockets and he will collect 
them to feed his children. He is thus related with a fear of losing one’s eyes. Fear of 
losing one’s eyes is, according to Freud, a substitute for a fear of being castrated 
because there is a substitutive relationship between the eye and the male organ that 
exists in dreams, myths and fantasies. So, one of the reasons for the uncanniness of this 
story lies in a return of repressed castration anxiety, which is made strange by 
repression.  
But Freud was also aware that the feeling of uncanniness was a feeling that arises 
in different situations and not everything that is uncanny fulfils this condition of 
undergoing repression and returning from it. Thus, the second line of argument bases 
itself on other instances of the uncanny when one finds oneself in inexplicable 
situations, such as the sense of déjà vu and the mysterious repetition of things (such as  
numbers) in particular place or date, coincidences and instances of wish-fulfilment. In 
these cases it is as if one is reminded that something in one’s life seems to confirm some 
surpassed mode of thought, such as the belief in the omnipotence of thoughts, or in 
secret injurious powers. In these instances of the uncanny there’s not exactly a 
repression which returns in another form but rather a confirmation of the continuing 
persistence of surmounted beliefs. The reality one believed is turned upside down and 
one loses one’s confidence in one’s beliefs. Freud says that here is a “conflict of 
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judgement as to whether things which have been surmounted, and are regarded as 
incredible may not after all be possible” (1955, 19). 
The difference between these two main instances of uncanniness lies in the fact 
that in the first case, the uncanny stems from the infantile complexes and is concerned 
with a repression of some content of thought with a belief in the reality of such a 
content. In the second case, there is more a questioning of a situation, of a content, 
which was believed to be real but has deceived us. Freud is not sure whether these two 
categories can converge if we include the notion of surmounting in the term repression. 
He argues in the case of the repression of infantile anxieties that what is repressed is an 
ideational content while in the other case of surmounting the animistic beliefs; there is a 
repression of a belief in the reality of content.  
Although towards the end of his essay Freud separates these two categories of 
the uncanny, he concludes in a paradoxical way that these two classes of the uncanny 
experience are not always sharply distinguishable. This paradoxical conclusion can lead 
us to argue that the origins of an uncanny experience cannot be fixed and most 
importantly uncanniness is also related to an impossibility of representing. In fact isn’t 
the fear of losing one’s eyes in Hoffman’s story another version of the fear of losing any 
possibility of representing the world, of interpreting it? 
Indeed, Freud also argues that the sense of the uncanny is often produced when 
the distinction between fantasy and reality is blurred, when something we regarded as 
imaginary appears before us in reality or symbols take over the full functions of the 
thing they symbolise. I think with this argument he opens up the possibility that 
uncanniness can point to the impossibility of representation. In fact, if we analyse the 
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meaning of the term we find out that “uncanny” also means “beyond knowledge”38.This 
aspect of the uncanny is also mentioned in Samuel Weber’s re-reading of Freud’s text 
“The Uncanny”. 
In his article “Uncanny Thinking” Weber departs from a re-analysis of the 
castration anxiety and shows that castration anxiety is an anxiety born from the very 
fact that it is never fully graspable. He believes that it is impossible for castration to be a 
visible theme, since it is based on a negative vision of sexual difference.  
So, the relationship that exists between castration anxiety and the uncanny is a 
relationship based on the impossibility of desire reaching its object and having a 
determinate representation, and a dislocation of an object of perception. In other 
words, castration anxiety is related with the impossibility of having a representation of 
the self. In that sense the uncanny becomes inseparable from questions of identification. 
Weber argues that uncanniness is  “that which affects and infects representations, 
motifs, themes and situations which…mean something other than what they are and in 
a manner which draws their own being and substance into the vortex of signification” 
(2000, 234). He also argues that it is through an enactment of a temporality that is 
discontinuous and suspended between “coups” and shocks of recognition as 
misrecognition, that the uncanny takes place. I want to argue that this discontinuity is 
no different from the discontinuity that exists within the subject who is split at the 
moment of the pose. As we have seen in this chapter the moment of the pose is a 
moment where the “subject” may be disturbed by the failure of his desire to have a 
unified self.  
                                                           
38 From Anneleen Masschelein’s “A Homeless Concept: Shapes of the Uncanny in Twentieth-Century 
Theory and Culture” http://www.imageandnarrative.be/uncanny/anneleenmasschelein.htm, 2003. 
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Departing from this, we can perhaps claim that although the origins of an uncanny 
experience cannot be fixed, the uncanny may denote the relation that exists between 
the subject and his conception, imagination of his/her “self”.  
If we return back to the very first question of this chapter, (why is our double, 
so uncanny, so irritating?), we can thus argue that this doubling is so irritating because 
of a paradox that is inherent in this very act of doubling.  The ego (which is driven by a 
desire to survive, as Freud says) sees itself outside itself once represented. But this 
double, this representation, does not permit it to feel infinite, to feel deathless. On the 
contrary, it remains the reminder of death because this double image is separated, 
detached from everyday life and it is paradoxically “other” to the self. 
“What had been one’s own living identity (or identification) becomes, once 
represented, an expropriated, deadly resemblance-a frozen mirror, a cold statue…” 
says Borch-Jacobsen (1991, 45). It is perhaps because of the paradox of facing the 
possibility of our metaphorical death (because our “representation” is in a way a 
reduction, a death of who we are, into a frozen image) while trying to overcome it that 
we feel so uncannily disturbed by our double, be it a reflection, or a (projected) image. 
 As we have seen in this chapter, one example of experiencing such uncanniness 
happens at the moment of posing. The next chapters will continue to emphasise this 
aspect of the act of posing by focusing this time on a close analysis of some visual texts 
in order to come to the final conclusion that this uncanniness might be one of the ways 
the subject can have a productive look towards him/herself.  
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We know that people are formed 
by light and air, their inherited 
traits, and their actions, and we 
recognise people and distinguish 
one from another by their 
appearance. We can tell from 
appearance the work someone 
does or does not do; we can read 
in his face whether he is happy or 
troubled, for life unavoidably 
leaves its trace there. 
August Sander, The Nature and 
Development of Photography 
 
 
 
4. August Sander’s poseurs: towards the possibility of questioning the  
“self” 
 
4.1 A short introduction to August Sander’s work and background 
 
August Sander (1876-1964) is a German photographer who can be considered as one of 
the 20th century’s most important portrait photographers. According to Ulrich Keller, 
who provides a detailed introduction to Sander’s work and life in the preface to August 
Sander: Citizens of the Twentieth Century, although Sander started his career as a 
commercial portraitist, his best-remembered photographs were taken after 1910, when 
there is a shift from once flattered and beautified subjects, to a more analytical, and 
detailed capture of the human condition. As emphasised in Leo Rubinfien’s article, 
entitled “The Mask behind the Face”, after 1910 Sander’s photographs epitomised one 
side of what in the Weimar period would be called the Neue Sachlichkeit.  
This term is explained by George Baker (who effectively analyses Sander’s 
photographs in “Photography Between Narrativity and Stasis: August Sander, 
Degeneration and the Decay of the Portrait”) as follows: “Less a movement than a 
shared set of cultural attitudes, the term Neue Sachlichkeit (roughly, New Objectivity or 
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Sobriety) seems to have been coined by Gustav Friedrich Hartlaub as the title for a 1925 
exhibition at the Mannheim art gallery, consisting of art that rejected the fragmentation 
of Impressionism and Expressionism in favour of, as Hartlaub put it, ‘loyalty to a 
positively tangible reality’” (1996, 75-76).  
Indeed, the term Neue Sachlichkeit has been used for a very wide range of 
German art and literature in the aftermath of World War I, including artists like 
Thomas Mann, George Grosz and Sander’s friend, Otto Dix. It has often meant 
“reportorial”, indicating a seemingly more “objective” work than the High German 
Expressionism of the early 20th century, and in photography it was characterised by 
sharp focus, clear lighting, the absence of distortions and emotions.  
Sander worked mainly in Cologne and its environs. Although he also 
photographed landscapes and factories, he is valued primarily for his portraits which for 
Ulrich Keller “touched concerns central to German life in the Weimar and early Nazi 
periods, and through them, some of the central paradoxes of modern life” (Keller 
quoted in Rubinfien, 97).  
Indeed, Sander was both concerned with classifying his poseurs into “types” and 
“archetypes”, and in portraying them as universal and transparent, (avoiding making any 
visible connection between the people he portrayed and the social context in which 
they are photographed). Thus, his project paradoxically aimed at a certain objectivity 
and neutrality without taking into consideration the living conditions of the Weimar 
period during which German society suffered from poverty and political violence.  
In 1929 Sander published 60 portraits under the name Antlitz der Zeit whose 
usual English translation is The Face of Our Time, but which could also be translated as 
Rubinfien argues, The Face of the Times or The Face of Time. As those titles indicate, 
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Sander’s desire was not to satisfy his clients’ order but rather to record the 
physiognomic image of a whole German generation. That’s why in The Face of Our 
Time Sander withholds the names of his subjects, leaving it uncertain which 
photographs were commissions and which were made for his own documentary 
purposes.  
Departing from The Face of Our Time, Sander envisaged a much more massive 
project, entitled Menschen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Citizens [or people] of the Twentieth 
Century). It was intended to be a seven-volume work that would consist of portraits 
made between the early 1900s and the 1950s and aimed to give a synoptic view, a 
photographic index of German society, organised in both professional and non-
professional groups (e.g. “Businessmen”, “The Sick”, “Farmers”, “Workers”, “Artists” 
etc.). Each photograph was thus intended to be situated in relation to a larger and 
definitive classification: a social hierarchy fixed through a series of seemingly objective 
images of representative figures or types.  
This project was never published during Sander’s life. Indeed, most of Sander’s 
work, including The Face of Our Time, was banned, confiscated and destroyed without 
explanation after the Nazis came to power. Thus, the chance of realising Menschen des 
20. Jahrhunderts under the Third Reich became very slight. But Sander went on refining 
the project in private and continued to photograph in the later 1930s and 1940s, 
increasing the number of pictures in Menschen des 20. Jahrhunderts and adding such 
groups as “The Persecuted” (Jews) and “Foreign Workers”.  
Moreover, in the later 1930’s, Sander’s oldest son Erich, who had been seized 
by the Nazis as an active Communist, sent a number of pictures of his prison inmates to 
his father, who included some of them in his project as “Political Prisoners”.  
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Sander’s political position at that time was not so clear. However, after the death of his 
son in captivity, Sander showed concretely his contempt for the Nazis by writing in his 
postwar letter that the Nazis were “subhuman” (2004, 97). Also, as a furious gesture of 
protest, he displayed the raw head of a pig in the shop window of his studio in Cologne. 
Despite the fact that he had little chance to express himself safely through his work, and 
despite the loss of 30,000 negatives in a fire in 1949, Sander resumed publishing and 
exhibiting after the war, and the last collection to appear in his lifetime was 
Deutschenspiegel (A German Mirror, 1962).  
His major posthumous books are Menschen ohne Masken (Man without Masks), 
published in 1971, and the abridged Menschen des 20. Jahrhunderts, published in 1980. All 
of the photographs included in my study are taken from a 1981 edition of Menschen des 
20. Jahrhunderts and will be analysed throughout this chapter in close detail.  
But before going into an analysis of Sander’s photographs, I first want to give a 
more detailed account of how our relationship to photography and to the photographic 
camera can constitute the way we apprehend/recognise ourselves. In order to do this 
let me first introduce two important concepts used by Lacan and Silverman -namely the 
screen and the dominant fiction- in order to understand better the ways in which we are 
related to ourselves and to each other through images. 
 
4.2 The screen and the dominant fiction 
In my first chapter I mentioned how the photographic camera can be seen as a metaphor 
for the gaze by referring to Kaja Silverman’s re-reading of Lacan and Jonathan Crary.  
In the second chapter, I introduced the Lacanian “mirror stage” and the paradoxical 
subject/image relationship. I now want to continue to deepen our understanding of our 
understanding of our relationship to images and how we are constituted and recognised 
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through/by them by explaining the Lacanian concept of the screen that is not only very 
fundamental to my project but also will provide a better understanding of how and why 
photography can be a medium for categorising, identifying, fixing human subjects, as is 
the case with Sander’s attempt.  
After providing an account of the screen, I will also introduce a sub-category of 
the screen, namely the dominant fiction (that is the normative representations through 
which the subject can both affirm/recognise him/herself and others) in order to 
examine later on by departing from a close reading of Sander’s photographs, whether 
the act of posing can be a moment of questioning/challenging our perspectiveive vis-à-
vis the dominant fiction. Let’s start then by giving an account of what is at stake in the 
field of vision, which plays an important role in the ways we constitute our identity and 
relationship to ourselves and to others. 
 
4.2.1 The Gaze and the subject in the field of vision 
 
 
 
 
Fig.10 
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In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, Lacan elaborates the field of 
vision and the role/place of the gazing/looking subject in it, basing his model of vision 
on the philosophical tradition inherited from Sartre in order to expand his ideas. He 
first of all provides a Cartesian account of vision, in which the subject surveys the world 
from a transcendental position. (See Figure 10.1)  
In this figure the “Geometral point” is the place where the subject gazes on the 
world from an authoritative position. This figure represents the unilinear perspective of 
Leon Battista Alberti, in which the Renaissance artist surveys the object to be depicted 
through the mediating frame of the image which is metaphorically a transparent pane of 
glass through which he sees the object and turns it into a canvas on which he paints the 
outside world.  This account of vision, separating the subject from the object it 
observes and providing him with a sense of superiority, presents vision to us as 
something transparent.  
In the second diagram (10.2) however, the “image” of the first diagram is 
turned into the screen and in this case the observer is observing the object not from a 
transparent frame but rather he/she can only see the object in the guise of the image 
(picture). More importantly, Lacan situates the subject now at the site marked 
“picture”, and the gaze on the side of the “point of light”. In this case both the “subject-
as-spectacle” and the “subject-as-look” are situated outside the gaze and therefore 
cannot lay claim to any of the epistemological authority implicit in the first model.  
 Therefore the gaze in Lacan’s account is not only separated from the human 
eye (it is inapprehensible) but also the subject is now not the one who gazes but the one 
who is looked-at. In other words, Lacan reveals that we depend upon the “other” not 
only for our meaning and desires but also for our very confirmation of the self.  Lacan 
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also argues that in the second diagram the screen is opaque and the subject is now a 
picture seen through the screen. In other words the subject cannot be apprehended per 
se. He/she is mediated by the screen. 
The next diagram (figure 10.3) represents the conflation of the previous ones, 
summarising Lacan’s account of the field of vision and giving us the schematisation of 
the “spectacle of the world” in which the subject-seeing is also the subject-in-sight. He 
or she is named now as “the subject of representation”,  representing, interpreting and 
seeing the world but also being gazed at, represented, and interpreted by the 
inapprehensible gaze inherent in the field of vision.   
In the Lacanian field of vision the subject is thus shuttling back and forth 
between “being seen” and “seeing”, and is unable to occupy either of these positions 
with any stability or authority. Once again, the relation between the terms on the left 
and the terms on the right is mediated by the image/screen.  
In addition, Kaja Silverman, points out that, although Lacan begins with a 
Sartrean definition of the field of vision, he differs from Sartre in an important respect. 
Lacan argues in Four Fundemantal Concepts of Psychoanalysis that the gaze (which 
represents for Sartre a “pure” or “absolute” subject) escapes the category of the subject. 
He thus de-anthropomorphizes the gaze by associating it with both the function of light 
and the function of seeingness. This “function” precedes any individual act of looking. In 
that sense, the gaze can be considered as the manifestation of the symbolic within the 
field of vision. It is indeed in that sense that it can be associated with the camera because 
both the gaze and the camera are working secretly and powerfully in capturing, framing 
us, as well as attaching, projecting on us an identity. As stated by Silverman:  
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“When we feel the social gaze focused upon us, we feel photographically ‘framed’…the 
converse is also true: when a real camera is trained upon us, we feel ourselves 
subjectively constituted, as if the resulting photograph could determine ‘who’ we are” 
(1996, 135). 
In other words, the camera/gaze is an apparatus whose function is to put us “in 
the picture”, by “re-presenting” us. But how can the camera/gaze perform such an act? 
For Silverman, the camera/gaze cannot have such a power alone as she argues that: 
It [the gaze] does not determine what the picture will be, nor what it will 
mean for us to “be” there…How we are “photographed” and the terms under 
which we experience our specularity, are the result of another agency 
altogether, as are the values which we impute to the gaze (1996, 168).  
 
And the agency she refers to is the screen, as she adds: 
The Screen represents the site at which the gaze is defined for a particular 
society and is consequently responsible both for the way in which the 
inhabitants of that society experience the gaze’s effects, and for much of the 
seeming particularity of the society’s visual regime (1996, 135).  
 
Considering all these ideas of Silverman, we can thus say that what constitutes the ways 
in which we see, and are seen, the terms under which we are constituted as subjects, is 
not the result of the camera/gaze per se but is the product of the screen. Or more 
specifically, our “identity” and “identification” within a society depends on what the 
society does with the camera/gaze, and with the values it confers to it. 
Although Lacan does not clearly define the screen (he also refers to it as the 
screen/image), he is however aware that it intervenes between us and our 
seeing/representing of the world, between us and our (self-)recognition. According to 
Norman Bryson who gives a detailed account of Lacan’s concept of screen in “The Gaze 
in the expanded field”, the screen is what is inserted between our retina and the world. It 
is the screen of signs: “a screen consisting of all the multiple discourses on vision built into 
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the social arena” (1988, 92). For Lacan , because of the opaqueness of the screen, we can 
never have  transparent access to ourselves and to the world. We are always mediated. 
But what exactly is the screen? What is it constituted of?  
For both Silverman and Lacan the screen is a repertoire of images, of 
assumptions, of accumulations, (within our memory), through which subjects are 
constituted, defined, affirmed or rejected. In other words, it gives shape and meaning 
to how we are “seen” by others but also how we see/recognise ourselves.  
Moreover, the screen inhabits each of us as much as language does. For 
Silverman this means that when we apprehend another person or object, we inevitably 
do so via the screen.  As she also says, the screen is a “large, diverse but ultimately finite 
range of representational coordinates which determines what and how the members of 
our culture see-how they process visual detail and what meaning they give it” (1996, 
221). 
  In other words, the screen is also like a curtain that both makes things visible and 
also prevents us from seeing the world and each other “as such”. Bryson adds that the 
screen “casts a shadow” and Lacan sometimes calls it “scotoma”, sometimes stain. For 
when we look through the screen what we see is caught up in a network that is greater 
than its individual agents. So the point at which one learns to see socially is when one 
articulates his/her retinal experience with the codes of recognition that come from 
one’s social milieu.  
Vilem Flusser in Towards a Philosophy of Photography describes our 
relationship to images in a very similar way. 
Images are meant to render the world accessible and imaginable to man. But 
even as they do so, they interpose themselves between man and the world. 
They are meant to be maps, and they become screens. Instead of presenting 
the world to man, they re-present it, but put themselves in place of the 
world, to the extent that man lives as a function of the images he has 
produced. He no longer deciphers them but projects them back into the 
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world “out there” without having deciphered them. The world becomes 
image-like (1984, 7). 
 
 
Giorgio Agamben also provides an account congruent with that of Flusser when he 
argues in Means without Ends that human beings, unlike animals, tend to appropriate 
their own exposition, their being manifest, by separating images from things and by 
giving names to images. In other words, they put images in between themselves and the 
world. That’s why they are so interested in mirror images since they want to recognise 
themselves and take possession of their own appearance. The screen is thus constituted 
of such images and it can be considered as this matrix, whereby the human subject is 
recognised, apprehended, appropriated and projected.  
Silverman questions the screen and argues that it is a “culturally generated image or 
repertoire of images through which subjects are not only constituted, but differentiated 
in relation to class, race, sexuality, age, and nationality” (1996, 135). Moreover, by 
arguing that the camera is a metaphor for the gaze, Silverman extends her definition of 
the screen to be something more than a repertoire of ideologically differentiating images. 
If the camera is equated with the gaze within a society, this also suggests that the gaze 
cannot be reduced to a certain, unchangeable form of authoritative vision. Because the 
camera is not a timeless and fixed machine but it is also a complex field of relations. As 
Jonathan Crary remarks, what constitutes the camera is precisely  
its multiple diversity, its “mixed” status and an epistemological figure within a 
discursive order and an object within an arrangement of cultural practices. The 
camera is…“simultaneously and inseparably a machinic assemblage of 
enunciation”, an object about which something is said and at the same time an 
object that is used. It is a site at which a discursive formation intersects with 
material practices (1990, 30). 
 
In other words, a definition of the camera as a representational network of material 
practices that are open to change can help us to conceive of the screen as a historically 
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variable apparatus. In this sense Silverman also criticises Lacan, for whom the visual 
domain would seem to be static and uninfluenced by cultural changes, arguing that the 
screen is subject to change from culture to culture, from time to time, and she prefers to 
use the term Cultural Screen for the screen, to emphasise this characteristic.  
However, according to Silverman, we should be careful not to confuse the 
screen with the dominant fiction. What she calls the dominant fiction is what passes for 
acceptable realities in a given society. It consists of normative representations that still 
find their roots in the binary opposition of sexual categories and in the historical 
variation, racial categories and class and other forms of social differences. She adds that 
the dominant fiction can only sustain itself if the larger society affirms it. The dominant 
fiction is thus a system of intelligibility. However, it is not simply the screen because the 
screen does not only consist of normative representations but also of all kinds of 
oppositional and sub-cultural representations.  
We can thus have two main positions vis-à-vis the screen. We can either take the 
position from which we apprehend and affirm those elements of the screen that are 
synonymous with the dominant fiction. Or we can occupy a different viewing position 
that Silverman defines as the “productive look”. 
In the next chapter I will explain this term. I will also try to argue that the act of 
posing is one of the moments which can provide us with a “productive look” by 
continuing my analysis with the last visual corpus of my project. But for now I would 
like to extend the reasons why in a given society the members tend to affirm the 
dominant fiction and how the dominant fiction affects Sander’s photographic project. 
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4.2.2 Seeing through the screen 
 
Silverman refers to one aspect of Freud’s accounts of vision in order to explain better 
how the human subject tends to affirm the dominant fiction. Freud starts examining the 
process of vision in the Interpretation of Dreams and he argues that the visual stimuli enter 
the psyche by passing through the unconscious and pre-conscious mnemic reserves. At 
the level of the preconscious, a process of classification occurs whereby the stimuli are 
“recognised” through their paradigmatic grouping with other similar stimuli (1955, 
533). 
To give an example Silverman says that when the subject sees a red chair, it is 
classified at the level of his/her pre-conscious under the categories of “chair” and “red 
object” for example, and this permits the subject to apprehend it. She also adds that the 
pre-conscious also performs some screening functions; therefore it may classify the chair 
in more evaluative ways, so for example, it may reject it as “cheap” or “appropriate for 
children”.  
Moreover, she points out that, even before registering that perception, the 
chair is also placed in communication with unconscious memories in such a way that it 
may undergo a much more complex semanticization. For example, through its shape or 
its colour it may become connected with the chair in which the subject’s mother used 
to sit. In other words, the red chair is subject to displacement in a way that can partake 
of some of the values which emanated outward from those wishes or patterns which 
persist and insist at the level of the subject’s unconscious.  
Indeed, Silverman says that “perhaps it [the red chair] will become a prop in the 
night’s re-staging of my unconscious fantasmatic in the reminting of what Freud calls 
the ‘stereotype plate’, which underpins my dreams, my fantasies and my object choices” 
(1996, 180).  
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In other words, “seeing” is nothing but an affirmation of what has left its traces on our 
unconscious. The human subject cannot see everything because it can only see literally 
when the stimulus coincides/matches with the mind’s unconscious inscriptions. And 
this coincidence is not based only and primarily on conscious belief, but more 
importantly it involves the activation of certain desires and identifications that are both 
driven by the desire of the subject to fulfil its lack. What we call the screen is thus the set 
of inscriptions, a matrix that exists in us and that makes possible a certain perception of 
the world. The dominant fiction is that set of inscriptions within a society on which its 
members agree. It is like the visible part of the iceberg, if we formulate it in a more 
metaphorical way. It permits us to affirm, agree upon certain values and to reject 
others. It is all the categorisations that we make within a society in order to evaluate 
and choose some things over others.   
If we look at Sander’s photographs, we can also see that, within the society and 
the artistic realm in which he lived and worked, (the Weimar period and the movement 
of “new objectivity”), categorising the individuals, in a hierarchical way, (starting with 
the farmers as the roots of society and proceeding to the upper class, for example) 
and/or identifying them according to their jobs, seems to be a significant way of 
forming, identifying, framing the subject.  
Moreover, we can also clearly see in his project an undervaluation of the people 
who constitute the “marginal” class as he categorises the mentally ill, jobless, or people 
who are rejected in society under the titles of “servants”, “itinerants” and “the last 
people” and puts them at the very end of his classification.   
This categorisation is an old practice pertaining to the values conferred upon 
photography at the very beginning of its practise, as I already mentioned in my chapter 
entitled: “Portraiture and Early Photographic Practice”.  Moreover, we also saw in that 
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chapter that the portrait was above all a public affirmation of significance, and 
photography extended the availability of the portrait as an object of identity; thus 
portrait photography became one of the tools at the service of highlighting the dominant 
fiction within a society.  
As both Silverman and Barthes argue, and as is also apparent in Sander’s 
project, despite its claimed “objectivity”, the camera/gaze has the power to categorise, 
define, affirm and reject individuals, and this can induce in the poseurs a certain feeling 
of being “subjectively formed”. We saw in the third chapter that as a reaction to that 
“formation”, the poseurs might either pose in a manner that seeks to adapt to and/or 
confirm this formation. Or they may pose in order to protect themselves from it.  
However, as I also started to suggest in this third chapter, my overall aim is to 
go beyond these two possibilities of “(self-)framing” in order to reveal that the act of 
posing bears the potential for freedom from any act of (self-)formation, and/or 
attachment to the self that can manifest itself in the form of (self-) 
affirmation/recognition and/or (self-)protection.  Posing has the potential to question 
and challenge our position vis-à-vis the dominant fiction and the screen. I will deal with 
that possibility in more detail in the next chapter. I want however start to see how this 
possibility can manifest itself by analysing some visual texts. 
So let us start with Sander’s photographs in order to discover the traces of such 
a possibility in the photographs of the poseurs and to let the visual text contribute to 
our arguments about the act of posing. 
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4.3 Sander’s poseurs questioning the screen 
4.3.1  Exposing the conflicting “self” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here is a woman (Figure 11), a part-time student as indicated by the title, standing 
calmly next to a wall that does not give us any clues about the environment in which 
she is situated. Indeed, in most of Sander’s photographs the observer/photographer is 
generally left alone with the poseur. It seems as if Sander wanted to focus on the 
portrayed person alone, making the surrounding look as abstract as possible, as neutral 
as possible, so that the photograph can “objectively” portray the poseur.  
Fig.11  
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The presence of such a wall works in many of his other photographs (such as figures 15, 
16, 17) as a background upon which the shadow of the standing person is softly cast. 
This shadow seems to want to show us something more than the physical traits of the 
person. Something that is not so easily graspable, something that goes beyond the 
limited, fixed “figure”, or outline of her body.  
At first look, this shadow seems like the “antithesis” of this woman because it is 
in contrast with her sharply focused and detailed figure. This shadow is also in 
communication with the darkest shape within the composition, situated at the right of 
the woman: a bit of a door and its shadow. The woman looks as if she is trapped in 
between this door and her own shadow, both delimiting in their own way the 
composition.  
However, the fact that both of these areas are not so sharp, and the fact that 
they form tones and not outlines, reverses this impression and creates a feeling of 
movement between delimitation and expansion.  
All of this makes less determinate the ways in which the woman stands out. If 
we consider (departing from Sander’s position within the Neue Sachlichkeit) that the aim 
of this photograph was to give fixed, “objective”, information about the identity of the 
poseur, after observing the details of the composition we may start to doubt whether 
this photograph really reaches it aim. Indeed, if we analyse the pose of the woman in 
more detail we can reveal more clues about the ambiguity this photograph creates in us. 
  If one expects the act of posing to be an act in which the poseur seems to be in 
tune with his/her pose, this woman seems to break this feeling of security, of self-
confidence, of being “one” with herself. Like her shadow that seems to escape from her, 
her pose seems also to escape from her “intended” self. 
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First of all we can see the traits of some indecision in her posture and her gaze. Her eyes 
are looking at the photographer with an air of discomfort.  She looks as if she is 
enduring some forced position, and that she did not choose the way she is standing in 
this photograph. What increase this effect are the way her hands are positioned and the 
way she has positioned her legs. Her hands look as if they are in this position because 
she did not know what else to do with them. She perhaps also looks as if she has put her 
hands in that position because Sander asked her to do so. 
 Indeed, her hands do not look very natural, not only because it would be tiring 
to hold them in that position for a long time but also because they look a bit dirty, like 
those of a child. That’s why they also have an air of clumsiness (ineptness). When it 
comes to the feet, although we cannot see them, we can guess from the positioning of 
the legs that they might be positioned in an open way to the sides. This contrasts with 
the “introverted” hands.  
All this makes her look as if she is in conflict with herself. Especially her upper 
body seems to be trying to fit into a pose, while her legs (which are cropped and left 
out), her implied feet, her hands and her gaze, seem to escape from this pose, revealing 
a more unintentional position. Based on this conflict she also looks as if she is trying to 
hide something about herself.  
What we see here is perhaps an exposition of the paradoxes of the poseur, 
his/her uneasiness in front of the camera where he/she seems to be in-between hiding 
and exposing him/herself.  
Graham Clarke, in a detailed analysis of Sander’s photographs in his “Public 
Faces, Private Lives: August Sander”, argues that there is indeed a paradox that 
underlines Sander’s entire project, as there is an ongoing tension (within the 
photographs) between public and private selves; between a private identity and its 
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definition and representation in a social context. As we have seen in our example, there 
seems in fact to be a splitting of the self. On the one hand, we see the traces of a more 
private, (indecisive, clumsy, cropped out) self and on the other hand, the appearance of 
another self that is trying to put itself into the social context, trying to be approved, 
recognised by others.  
In Clarke’s terms, there is an uneasy relationship between the individual 
presence and the social “label”. Clarke argues that Sander’s photographs: “…image 
individuals amidst a palpable and wonderfully detailed social frame, but they do so as 
part of a questioning rather than affirming process of definition” (1992, 73). Let’s 
continue then with this argument and see how Sander’s poseurs exhibit a 
questioning/blurring of their supposed identity despite their very effort to affirm it, to 
be in tune with it. 
If we go back to the photograph under discussion, there seems indeed to be a 
conflict between the “private” and the “public” self in Part-time Student, and one of the 
reasons for that conflict comes from the way the woman’s hands are positioned and 
exposed.  Her hands not only easily draw our attention by being positioned in the 
centre of the composition, but also they look like the only detail of this photograph that 
breaks the artificiality of her stance because they give the impression that she didn’t 
know what to do with them. Doesn’t it frequently happen that when one feels uneasy, 
bored or unable to control oneself, one does not know what to do with one’s hands?  
The hands in general can be considered one of the parts of the body (like the 
face) that cannot be concealed.  In this photograph however the hands also create the 
feeling that they both show (expose) and hide some truth about the “self”. What 
increases this effect is the fact that one of the hands is on the top of the other, as if 
foregrounding a gesture of hiding.   
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As also emphasised by Clarke, in some of Sander’s portraits (such as figure 12, 13, 14) 
we repeatedly see a similar positioning of the hands.  
For Clarke, the hands, together with the posture and the stance can be 
considered at first sight as important elements of social meaning. In Sander they 
become available to us as a signifier of difference and definition: a worker’s hands, a 
bank official’s hands, a boxer’s hands, etc. And they may have different characteristics, 
all bearing some traces of the work they are doing. 
 Clark adds that the hands are part of the public presentation of the body, like 
the face and in opposition to the physical and sexual parts that are hidden by clothes. 
They may be more crucial in some instances, such as in the portrait of farmers where 
they are often textured, with dirt (soil) beneath the fingernails, as they become almost a 
sacred icon of a life based on nature and land.  
However, in this case (Figure 11) they seem to be ambivalent. They might even 
foreground the fact that the social identity of the poseur (although it may be sustained 
by visual codes such as clothes, rings and medals), is nevertheless problematic, mainly 
because the hands of this part-time student look alien, not fitting to the (self-confident, 
decisive?) image she would like to give herself? We can thus argue that she looks as if 
she might be someone unrefined trying to look refined. Moreover, physically she looks 
a bit masculine because of her “butch face” and her hands that look like the hands of a 
worker (perhaps a farmer).  
Clarke argues that Sander’s photographic portraits, despite their goal of 
objective clarity, “contrive to ask both what lies under the surface and, in turn, what 
‘lies’ are imaged on the surface” (1992, 74). He bases his reading on an analysis of 
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Sander’s self-portrait taken in 1937 (Figure 12).39 He first remarks that, unlike his other 
portraits such as “the Artist” or the “Writer”, this portrait does not give any clue about 
Sander “the Photographer”. There is no declared social function or frame of reference 
by which the portrayed person is to be defined. He adds that this image is empty of 
significant detail. Sander’s suit, for example, lacks any identifying marks. It only reflects 
the general social mores and codes of dress. 
 However, if we continue to look at the photograph, the lack of expression on 
his face, and the seeming neutrality of the pose, begin to appear faked and forced. For 
Clarke, Sander has rendered his self in such a way that his history, private life and 
feelings are hidden from our gaze. Clarke thus argues:  
The image declares that “this is me”, but it also states that “this is not me”. 
Paradoxically, in having his portrait taken Sander is denying the very act of portrayal. 
The ostensible assured “surface” of the photographic space gives way not so much to a 
fully rendered social being as to a “self” caught 
amidts presence and absence. If the face says, “You 
will not know who I am”, it equally says that “You 
cannot see who I am, nor how I feel”. Posing for 
the camera has become both a diffident and 
problematic act (1992, 76). 
 
For Clarke Sander’s hands suggest both the 
absence and presence of a hidden truth that is not 
made public. They point to a place between the 
hidden and the exposed. They declare the physical 
presence of a private condition and history. “If the 
right hand was removed…” says Clarke, “…we 
might see a scar, a tattoo, a missing finger or (in the context of the period) a number 
from a concentration camp” (1992, 77). 
                                                           
39 I find it useful to refer to the self-portrait of Sander, as I believe that it can be considered as a 
“signature” of the photographer’s entire project.  
Fig.12 
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So, despite the fact that Sander’s “citizens” might move through the scale of social 
significance, with their hands serving as the integers of the self, the evidence for such a 
claim becomes difficult and diffident in some instances, as is the case with Figures 11 
and 12, especially if we analyse their hands with respect to the overall body, pose and 
expression of the poseur.  
Let us continue the same argument with an analysis of two other photographs 
that seem to be in contrast if we consider their implied social label: The Master Tiler 
(Figure 13) and The Unemployed Man (Figure 14). As I have already pointed out, 
hands have a central significance in the case of craftsmen and tradesmen such as potter, 
cobbler, cook, saddler or tiler. In the Master Tiler too the hands rest but attract our 
attention. 
They express some elegance and are in harmony with the body’s calm, self-
contained position (unlike in Figure 11). They look as if they are locked and they close 
the circular shape created by the arms. Compositionally, they also constitute a center of 
gravity together with the hat. In short they seem to contribute to the unity of the pose 
of the figure. 
  Together with the hands, the suit seems also to contribute to the unity of the 
pose and to clarify the social position of the poseur. As a tiler, his suit reflects how 
attentive and neat he is (since his coat’s buttons shine and give him a much organised 
nature), and how careful and suited to the job he does. All the details of his dress 
including the pipe, also stress his well-being, which is emphasised by the stone 
background that might signify skill, weight and solidity. Clarke adds that this image is a 
“guild figure” where at first sight the tiler seems to reflect what he is, where there is a 
seeming unity between his public image and what it portends about a private self.  
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However, if we continue our analysis we can also remark that despite his seeming self-
confidence, dignity, stability, and his air of a man of skill and knowledge, the Master 
Tiler also seems like a person who has endured his fair share of suffering. His face 
reflects indeed the face of a man who saw many sufferings, or passed through many 
difficult life lessons. He also looks a bit discontent. One might ask at this point why he 
has such a lined face despite his seemingly self-confident appearance. This photograph 
seems simultaneously to announce a status (the status of being a master tiler) and also to 
expose the attempt at status in relation to an individual condition that might be 
something totally different.  
 Also, the fact that he is standing next to a wall (as if he needs to take support 
from it), and the fact that he is at the very corner of the wall, (precisely in between two 
spaces: the sharp and flat 
surface of the left, and the 
blurred surface on the right 
that leads our vision to a 
blurred openness, probably 
the window of an old 
building) gives us a feeling of 
insecurity and indecisiveness. 
He looks as if he is at the 
edge of or in between 
sharpness and blurriness, in 
between finitude and infinity. 
In that sense, he symbolically 
Fig.13 
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reminds us of the conflicting presence of the self that is in between exposing an 
affirmative, self-contained image and the knowledge that this image cannot reflect all of 
who he is (the painful inner conflicts, doubts, and ephemeral manifestation of the 
“self”). Perhaps the discontent visible on the tiler’s face comes from his 
acknowledgment that there will always remain an unreachable, uncapturable, 
unexposable and unknowable self and thus accentuates the plurality of the self. 
Now, if consider this image not on its own but in comparison with the next one 
(Figure 14) we can perhaps see that the overall photographic project of Sander also 
brings forward differences and pluralities, as Clarke argues:  
 
As we move through the ‘gallery’ of images, social status is assumed 
through an interplay of codes, each of which has a distinct (if shifting) 
significance as it validates the self-identity of the subject. And yet there is 
an implicit critique of the public self suggested precisely through that 
difference (1992, 82). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig.14 
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If we look at the photograph entitled Unemployed Man (Figure 14), one of the images 
from the category of The Last People, we can see significant similarities to The Master 
Tiler. First of all we can see that both of the figures lean against walls that make a corner 
between a sharp foreground and blurry background. Both have their hands hold 
together. Both hold hats. Both wear similar suits, waistcoats and shirts. However, the 
unemployed man seems to lack some details that the master tiler has. For example, his 
head is shaved and he does not have any beard or moustache; also, he does not stare at 
the camera and does not have a pipe.  
The master tiler’s face reflects 
more a private history in the sense 
that he seems to celebrate his 
individual significance more than the 
unemployed man. In addition to that, 
the unemployed man has creases in 
his jacket, which also lacks buttons 
and is buttoned clumsily. Also he has 
an open/absent shirt that both makes 
him look poor but also creates the 
impression that he is open without 
anything to hide and lose.  His suit seems not to fit him. Clarke argues that in many 
cases the suit plays an important role in Sander’s taxonomy of male presentation and 
identification. It helps in the fixing of individuals in relation to codes of vertical and 
hierarchical difference. Among his photographs there are indeed many where the suit 
brings a power to the body and becomes an extension of the wearer, such as in the 
Young National Socialist (see Figure 15).  
Fig. 15 
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Unlike the master tiler and the young National Socialist, the unemployed man’s dress 
with its crumples and its unfittingness, points to some ambiguity in his “status”, 
suggesting perhaps, as Clark argues while analysing another photograph that: “this is 
what I have been doing rather than this is how I want to be seen” (1992, 83). 
Indeed, in Unemployed Man there is on the one hand the appearance of a self that 
seems free from an imagined and projected self-image. But on the other hand, there is a 
negative index of signification, “a code of the unkept, unclean and the unsuccessful” 
(1992, 83), in Clarke’s terms. I want to argue that, despite this new set of codes 
emphasised by Sander to perhaps fix and define the individuals at the margins of society, 
such as also in Figures 18 and 19, the unemployed man looks paradoxically more self-
confident, at peace with himself than the master tiler.  
First of all, his expression is more serene. The fact that he does not stare at the 
camera increases this effect. Also the fact that he does not have so many signs (hair, 
beard, and pipe) of individual history like the master tiler makes him look stripped of 
any personal detail that would make him attached to himself. He looks as if he has 
nothing to lose and that might create in him a certain freedom, detachment from fear, 
or from any concern about how he would be seen in society.  
It is precisely because of this that he also looks as if he is both exposing and 
hiding a certain truth about himself, in the similar but reversed way from the master 
tiler. This time, he is in conflict because he seems to expose a certain security and inner 
peace despite his being photographed and labelled as being an unemployed, insecure 
man.  In that sense, it seems that both the Master Tiler and The Unemployed Man expose a 
certain paradox between a fixed, projected identity and its shattering.  
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There are some other examples where the poseurs exhibit a similar paradox in slightly 
different terms. In Figure 16 for example, we can see a similar composition and 
behaviour to those of the Part-Time Student (Figure 11). The woman is standing against a 
wall and her shadow appears to be “escaping” from her as it is cast on the wall (see 
Figure 11). Her stare is stronger and more energetic than the part-time student’s, 
probably because she is looking at the camera in a more self-confident, assertive way. If 
we read the title of this photograph we can see that she is The Politician Rosa Wolfstein-
Fröhlich. Since she is a politician, one might thus expect her to be a strong and assertive 
figure. But, if we analyse her overall pose, there is something striking. 
 Again the way she exposes (or hides?) her hands, seems ambiguous. Her left 
hand seems to be timidly holding onto her dress. The fact that it is higher than her right 
hand gives the impression that she is trying to withdraw it, as we withdraw our hand 
after touching something we 
shouldn’t have touched. 
Also, this hand might be 
interpreted as a sign of 
holding onto something from 
a desire for security. She thus 
looks as if she is holding on to 
her dress to protect herself 
(from the gaze of the camera, 
from exposing something 
about herself that she perhaps 
wants to hide).  
Although the right hand looks Fig.16 
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more loose and relaxed, both of the hands contrast with her gaze and more confident 
facial expression. It is as if her face is “extroverted” while her hands are “shy” and 
“introverted”. In addition to all this, her dress does not seem to reflect the formality 
that Part-time student has because her dress has some wrinkles and traces of its being 
worn often or for a long time. This gives her a cosy air and it makes her look like being 
not so formal and of having a stiff stance.  
All this creates a blurring of the self through a multiplication of the different 
manifestations of the self, in the sense that what appears here is the manifestation of a 
self which is in conflict with herself, between hiding and showing herself, indecisive 
even to what is happening with(in) herself. 
A similar conflict may be 
seen in other portraits such as 
Figure 17 and Figure 18. Figure 17 
is entitled The Painter Franz Wilheim 
Seivert and it seems to reflect a very 
introverted nature. In his pose we 
can see an attempt at self- 
protection because his arms are 
wrapped around his upper body as if 
to protect the core of his “self”. Also 
his gaze has an air of drawing back as 
if he is trying to consider carefully the moment and/or the photographer. And yet at 
this very moment of seeming protection, we can also see the appearance of an attitude 
that is content to “let it go”. If we analyse his facial expression in more detail we can see 
that his head’s position (slightly moved towards the left) seems less stiff than that of his 
Fig.17 
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body since his body looks more forced, bearing an unwanted position. His head and 
expression however look more neutral in the sense that his stare appears to say “I don’t 
care so much about what I am showing to others with this pose”. Also his eyes, although 
they might seem to have an air of obedience, also secretly escape from any attempt to 
capture them, because they look a bit dazed. It seems that he is inevitably exposing his 
feelings about this moment of posing while at the same time trying to hide them.  A 
similar effect exists in another photograph, The Persecuted Jewess, Mrs. Marcus (Figure 18).  
Here the woman seems at first sight to be in tune with her pose. The way she 
looks at the camera directly, and the trace of a possible smile especially near the left 
part of her lips, creates the impression that she is posing willingly. Indeed most of 
Sander’s poseurs were paid by him. 
 However, there is also a tension in this photograph because she is trying to 
close her coat as if she is 
explicitly hiding something 
about herself. Perhaps she 
is simply trying to be 
appropriate, to seem 
formal.  Moreover, we 
might also be disturbed 
when we read the title of 
this photograph: Persecuted 
Jewess, Mrs Marcus, 1938. 
We cannot know exactly 
whether she has been 
Fig.18 
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persecuted when she was posing for this photograph, but in case she has been, her pose 
seems to be in conflict with the atmosphere of the end of period of the Weimar 
Republic and the beginning of Nazism, where persecution of Jews was common. 
Therefore, with her seemingly self-confident and even optimistic posture and her 
gesture of closing her coat (as if she symbolically tries to hide with this gesture, the 
atmosphere of this era) she seems to be in the middle of a conflict. 
Moreover, because she was probably paid to “give” her pose, she was perhaps 
trying to act as perfectly as possible to hide any traces of incongruities between her 
appearance and the uncertainties and difficulties of the social context in which she was 
living. She was perhaps struggling to maintain a sense of decency.  
Indeed, for Leo Rubinfien, there is a theatrical aspect in Sander’s poseurs as 
well as a paradox, especially if we consider his project from the point of view of its time 
and socio-political conditions. He argues that “he [Sander] lived amid a disorder, so 
pronounced that it produced Hitler’s Reich, yet his quiet, seemingly transparent 
portraits make no obvious reference to the violence that roared outside everybody’s 
doors” (2004, 99). He adds later on that as soon as we consider the Weimar Republic’s 
atmosphere while looking at Sander’s portraits, we have to ask whether behind the 
seemingly calm, universal, elegance of the poseurs there is not an anxiety that the world 
will not cohere, that he/she might fail to hold his/her place within it.  
What we have seen up to now is that it is not only behind their faces that 
Sander’s poseurs experience a certain anxiety. It is in their pose that we can capture the 
conflicts they experience by seeing the traces of a conflicted self (conflicted between 
hiding and showing some truth about the self, between a social sanctioning and a private 
confusion. Perhaps we can even add to them a new conflict after analysing The Persecuted 
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Jewess, Mrs. Marcus and ask ourselves: Is it possible that at the very moment of their pose 
Sander’s poseurs are also faced with the impermanence of their own existence?  
Indeed, Rubinfien states that there is an insecure stateliness in Sander’s poseurs, 
“that strained, dissonant composite of pride and dread that seems so familiar to us, who 
live far more safely than they did but forever less so than we think” (2004, 104). 
Considering all of this we can thus argue that Sander’s poseurs expose a conflicting, 
plural, indecisive self, announcing identity only to dislodge its significance. This conflict 
can be traced back on different levels.  
There is a conflict in the personal level between showing and hiding some truth 
about the self. We saw for example how the part-time student exposes some uneasiness 
while posing that enabled us to read from her pose the traces of some insecurity and 
indecisiveness about her “self”.  
We also saw how a seemingly important member of the society such as the 
master tiler, can display some ambiguities in his pose so that he can expose some 
incongruities that collapse his expected (self)image of being self confident etc. 
We could also read another paradox into the opposite category of people, 
namely the unemployed man who seems not to expose a personal conflict but rather 
conflict with the intention of the photographer and which creates in the observer a 
feeling that he is escaping delicately from any attachment to his self.  
In all these cases we can see some cracks that seem to puncture the surface of 
the achieved objectivity and fixity of the social index of Sander’s “citizens”. We see the 
appearance of the conflicting self, rather then a self-contained, confident and affirmative 
one, despite the potential of the pose to provide one with a “defined” sense of the self. 
Indeed, if we consider that the act of posing can be one of the ways the subject affirms 
and is affirmed by the dominant fiction, the analysis of some of the poses of Sander’s 
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individuals reveals that this is not always the case. The act of posing can put into 
question and challenge the values by which the culture renders and portrays the 
individual, because in all the examples we have seen so far, the subject exposes a certain 
conflict within the self, a certain blurring, plurality and confusion about what we call 
the self. The next chapter will continue with this argument, this time focusing on a 
more recent Turkish photographic project that will not only extend our perspective, 
but will also provide us with  different examples of poseurs exhibiting a questioning of 
their subjectivity. 
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Freedom is not choosing; that is 
merely the move that we make when 
all is already lost. Freedom is knowing 
and understanding and respecting 
things quite other than ourselves. 
 
Iris Murdoch, A Severed Head 
 
The whole secret is hidden in the 
“other”. The “other” means difference. 
To accept and try to understand this 
difference is a window opening to self 
knowledge.40 
 
Ergün Turan, Süreyya Yılmaz 
Dernek, Biz 
 
From birth to death, and inversely, 
such is the passage of specular 
recognition and identification: a 
tireless alteration of two faces in which 
as subjects we search for “ours”41 
 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Portrait 
de l’Artiste en Général 
 
 
5) “Biz” (US): The pose as a Productive Look  
 
In the previous chapter I introduced and analysed how the subject identifies, recognises 
and sees him/herself and others through the screen. We also started to see how the act 
of posing may question and challenge this way of looking and relating (to ourselves and 
to others) through the screen, by departing from an analysis of Sander’s poseurs. I want 
now to introduce the theorisation of this challenging look, defined by Silverman as the 
productive look.  My main aim in this chapter will thus be to argue that the act of 
posing can be considered as a moment where the subject may have a productive look 
                                                           
40 “Bütün sır ‘Diğeri’inde gizli. Diğeri Farklılık demek.Farklılığı kabul etmek ve anlamaya çalışmak ise 
kendini bilmeye açılan bir pencere.” from Biz, the back cover. My Translation. 
41 Translated by Marianne Hirsh in “Masking the subject: Practicing Theory”. The Point of Theory: 
Practices of Cultural Analysis. Mieke Bal& Inge Boer (eds.), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
(1994, 111). 
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towards its “self” and where it can have a critical perspective to the act of (self-) 
identification and (self-)recognition. I want to show this possibility by mainly analysing 
the last corpus of my study, a recent Turkish photographic project entitled “Biz”. But 
before going into such an analysis let’s first try to understand what the Productive look 
is. 
5.1 The Productive Look 
We have already seen in the previous chapter that Silverman focuses on Freud’s 
challenge to one of the main assumptions pertaining to human vision, the assumption 
that human vision can objectively see what is outside itself. For Freud there is not only a 
delay between the introduction of a stimulus into the psyche and its conscious 
perception, but also, what we call perception is dependent on and made possible by an 
activation of our old memories and what has left its trace in our unconscious. Thus, 
when we look at an object we cannot escape attributing to it some psychic value, and 
most of the time, this attribution may work in ways that consolidate the dominant fiction. 
 One of the reasons for such an affirmative look lies in the fact that the 
signifying chains that operate in our minds, work to allow the disguised expression of 
the desire for an object, a person or a scene. In other words, every attempt at naming, 
affirming, recognising something is driven by an unconscious desire. Silverman argues 
that any act of recognition is an act of returning to those images that provide the 
fantasmatic grounding for all of our fantasies and object choices.  
To give an example, we can say that when one encounters someone he/she met 
for the first time, he/she may tend to find in this person’s traits some similarities with 
someone he/she already knows. This desire to recognise, find in this new person 
something that is familiar to his/her memories might be a return to an unfulfilled desire 
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about the person she/he already knows. So everything new or old that one encounters 
passes through this process and is manipulated and influenced by one’s desires and 
fantasies. Our recognition or rejection of things is driven by such an imperative to 
return. Silverman asks whether it is possible to get out of this pattern of returning, 
whether it is possible to relate to the world that surrounds us in a way that is not 
governed by unfulfilled desires.  
She then argues that when we look at an object there is an inevitable 
displacement that occurs and in general this displacement is not a one-sided 
displacement. Our glance at a red chair for example, can “induce us to look again at the 
whole concatenation of red things which we had stored in our memory without 
deeming them of any consequence and which undergo a transvaluation which will affect 
the way we look at a traffic light the next time” (1996, 181).  
She adds that this displacement can provide us with a potential to look that does 
not reside in the imperative to return but is motivated by the interlocking imperative to 
displace. Basing her argument on Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle Silverman adds 
that since desires and fantasies undergo a repression in the psyche, any object can only 
be remembered or recognised in the guise of a substitute. She argues: “There can thus 
be no return or recollection which is not at the same time a displacement, and which, 
consequently does not introduce alterity” (1996, 181).  
What she calls the productive look is thus a look that has developed a need for 
alterity, in such a way that its imperative to displace supersedes the imperative to 
return. But how is such a look be possible? 
For Silverman, Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida may provide an account of this 
desire for visual alterity when he distinguishes between two looks, the Studium and the 
Punctum. The Studium is what makes us culturally participate in the figures, gestures, 
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the settings and the actions when we observe things. For Silverman it is  “…what we 
see when we apprehend the world not only through a particular image repertoire but 
from the position which is assigned to us in advance- the position indicated by the 
geometrical point in Lacan’s first diagram” (1996, 182) (See figure 10). 
She adds that the Studium is thus the result of a “contract” between the creators 
and the consumers of culture to perpetuate those myths that are synonymous with 
normative representation.   
Punctum however is what breaks and punctuates the continuity of any 
interpretation that is shaped culturally. In a photograph it may be a detail that escapes 
the frame of symbolic reality. “Punctum is that accident which pricks me [but also bruises 
me, is poignant to me]” (1981, 27) says Barthes. It is a detail that punctuates our 
reception of any (intended) meaning by creating a space of personal involvement in 
seeing the image. It creates a duality with the Studium that is also described by Barthes 
as: “the extension of a field which I perceive…as a consequence of my knowledge, my 
culture” (1981, 25-26). The Punctum seems thus to be an interruption that prevents us 
from recognising and affirming any cultural knowledge. 
 Moreover, Silverman points out that for Barthes the eye has a transformative 
potential in the sense that it has an ability to look from a position which is not assigned 
in advance. The punctum can thus be defined for Silverman as “the “prick” one feels 
when an otherwise insignificant component of the screen comes into contact with one’s 
own mnemic reserve” (1996, 182).  
For Silverman, Barthes provides us with examples of such an intersection in 
Camera Lucida. For example, while analysing the portrait of an African-American 
woman he says that her necklace evokes one worn by someone in his own past. For 
him, to let a detail be embedded in such an associational matrix is to confer a new 
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significance to it. Therefore, the look Barthes brings to bear on the photographs 
reproduced in Camera Lucida is a look that is driven by an imperative of displacement. 
It is thus a look that is resistant to any stabilised visual standardisation.  
However, Silverman finds that Barthes’ “look” remains nevertheless not truly 
productive because it deploys memory for the purpose of making a representational 
element its “own”. Indeed, in most of Barthes’ readings of photographs, we can see that 
the displacement tends towards the direction of appropriating the photograph in the 
sense of connecting it to personal history, such as connecting the necklace to a person 
from his past. In other words, he is not totally “productive” in his look because he is still 
driven by his unconscious desire that makes him “read” the photograph from a limited 
perspective. 
 Whether one can have a total freedom from the unconscious (memories) 
while looking at something is questionable. But for Silverman, the productive look 
necessarily requires a constant conscious reworking of the terms under which we 
unconsciously look at the objects of our visual landscape. She argues indeed that “It 
[the productive look] necessitates the struggle first, to recognise our involuntary acts of 
incorporation and repudiation, and our implicit affirmation of the dominant 
elements of the screen, and then, to see again, differently” (1996, 184). 
 Moreover, she adds that it also necessarily entails the opening up of the 
unconscious to “otherness”.  But how is all this possible? What does this opening up 
to “otherness” exactly mean? 
For Silverman, the look can develop an inclination for unusual associations, or 
for diversity (which persists within metaphors), or for heterogeneity “which undoes the 
compulsive repetition through which every recollection is made to attest to the same 
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unconscious desire” (1996, 183). In this case it embraces the drift implicit in the 
imperative of displacement.  
However, such a look may also deploy memory primarily for the purpose of making a 
representational element its “own” (as happens in Barthes’ reading of some photographs 
in Camera Lucida), or as a validation of the “self”. In this case, although it still works 
through the imperative of displacement, it nevertheless remains a “remembering look” 
and not a productive look.  
Silverman adds that in order for the remembering look to become a productive 
look, it needs to accomplish a final displacement, the displacement of the ego. She 
argues indeed that: “It [the remembering look] does not fully triumph over the forces 
that constrain it to see in predetermined ways until its appetite for alterity prevails, not 
only over sameness, but also over self-sameness” (1996, 183). Here we come back to 
the problem of (self-) identification that is one of the main problematics of this thesis.  
Identification for Silverman is one of the most essential processes of the psyche 
as it provides the ground for all our relationships to others and to our “self”. The 
“mirror stage” is one of the examples of (self-) identification that shows how the subject 
is driven by a desire to identify with his/her image in order to close the gap that will 
always exist between his/her sensational body and its (ideal) image. And for Lacan this 
gap is the condition of becoming a “subject” within the symbolic realm.  
For Silverman identification with others can have two forms. We can either 
identify with objects by acknowledging these objects’ separateness from us or we can 
seek to abolish this distance or separateness. In the latter case, identification results in 
jubilation, a moment of joy when we can imaginarily coincide with the (ideal) image we 
worship from afar. That is when we feel ourselves affirmed, accepted, fitting, within 
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the dominant fiction, when we feel illusionarily and momentarily in unity with the world 
that surrounds us.  
Silverman adds, by referring to Lacan’s Seminar VII, that this desire for unity that 
motivates the subject’s identification with his/her mirror image is also a desire on the 
part of the subject to avoid the subject’s sensation of lack. Silverman argues in fact that 
the mirror image is also a 
Mirage” preventing the subject from apprehending his or her fundamental 
nothingness or “being-for-death”, a lure encouraging him or her to pursue 
endlessly that imaginary plenitude…However, it is also through this imago 
that he or she protects him-or herself against knowledge of that lack (1996, 
44). 
 
It seems thus that for Silverman, at the basis of our relationship with the world (through 
identification, recognition/rejection) lies an (un)conscious mechanism that protects us 
from experiencing, or knowing, the lack that constitutes our nature. One of the ways 
the subject attempts to avoid confronting his/her lack (or manque-à-etre in Lacan’s 
terms), is to diminish the distance between the sensational body and ideal images, 
through (self-) recognition which is always a mis-recognition. For her the productive look 
is a look that always seeks alterity and thus that never permits the illusionary and 
temporary matching of the subject with its ideal image.  
 I want to add here that although Silverman’s and Lacan’s accounts of the 
possibility of (self-) recognition and (self-) identification are conditioned by the 
supposed existence of a “lack” within the subject, and a desire to fulfil it, this thesis is 
approaching the concept of “lack” critically in order to argue that what the subject 
experiences while (mis-) identifying with others and with its “self”, is possible not 
because of the existence of a “lack” but  because of the presence of an emptiness. 
Although lack and emptiness seem to imply a certain absence, lack is related with an 
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insufficiency, whereas the emptiness is a rich, “plenitudious” absence in the sense that 
unlike lack, it is a condition that is not governed by a desire to be fulfilled.  
Therefore, I believe that to consider this emptiness as “lack” (as Lacan and 
Silverman seem to do) is to transform it into a negative void, the opposite of fullness. In 
this case one is within the parameters of the Hegelian dialectic. However, this thesis 
considers this emptiness as the condition of human existence and tries to reveal the 
ways it can be welcomed and experienced as it is, while arguing that it constitutes the 
necessary ground, making possible the coming forth of any “presence” and existence. 
I believe that the productive look can thus be read as a way of looking at the “self” 
and at “others”, freed from such a dialectical thinking, and it foregrounds the 
impossibility of (self-) recognition and (self-)identification. It is a look that prevents the 
mis-recognition of the ideality that one has conferred upon the “self” and/or the 
“other”.  
This impossibility might be manifested and/or experienced in several ways as 
we have already seen in our analysis of Sander’s photographs in the previous chapter.  I 
want to continue exploring the manifestations of this impossibility by analysing now the 
moments where the posing subject can experience a “discontinuity” and “otherness”, by 
referring to a visual analysis of the second corpus of my study: the photographs of 
Süreyya Yılmaz Dernek and Ergün Turan.  
 
5.2 “Biz” 
5.2.1 Introduction to the project. 
In 1998 two university students of photography, Süreyya Yılmaz Dernek and Ergün 
Turan envisaged a project that would be their final project for their degree. They 
decided to shoot the portraits of the people living in their city (Istanbul). Thus, carrying 
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with them a black panel that would foreground the details of the poseurs and neutralise 
the environment, they launched themselves into the streets of Istanbul, travelling from 
one district to another and asking the passers-by to stop their daily life for a few 
minutes of posing in front of the dark panel.  
 This was a very difficult task because hardly anybody wanted to pose for them. 
Especially women were cautious and very resistant to their demand. For this reason, 
the two photographers sought the help of a female friend who would come with them 
and explain to the passers-by that they were university students and they needed to take 
the portraits in order to pass their class. This explanation, which softened the offensive 
aspect of taking pictures, helped them a bit, especially in terms of shooting women, but 
they were only able to take a maximum of six photos a day. 42 
Their project lasted four years, not only because they travelled across the city, 
from Taksim, Beyoğlu to Kadıköy, from Üsküdar to Ortaköy, from Fatih to 
Süleymaniye, from Kasımpaşa to Sulukule and Dolapdere, but also because they chose 
their poseurs with great rigour. They mainly choose people who constitute what Orhan 
Pamuk calls a “tip”43. In four years they took more than four hundred portraits. They 
selected some of them and published them under a book entitled “Biz”, whose preface 
was written by Pamuk. At the end of the book we read the following statement about 
their project: 
In the streets of this town where we are living, we come into contact with the 
eyes of the “others” everyday. The whole town is filled with their voices, their 
pain and their joys. It breathes with them. At the corner of the town a black 
panel. Many different people stand in front of it. They look at us with all they 
have, their story. They are our world. They are “US”.44  
                                                           
42 The reason for this limitation was not indicated in the book “Biz”. 
43 If literally translated it means Type or Typology. However “tip” connotes the opposite meaning of 
type and is used to describe individuals who are unusual, unique, having a specific characteristic and thus 
unclassifiable. Quoted from “Biz” p13. 
44
 “Yaşadığımız bu kentin sokaklarında her gün sayısız yüzlerle, “Diğer” leriyle göz gözeyiz. Bütün bu 
kent onların sesleri, onların acı ve sevinçleri ile dolu. Onlarla soluk alıp veriyor. Kentin köşesinde kara 
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According to Orhan Pamuk, their project, although it departed from the simple idea of 
shooting portraits, revealed an unexposed side of the citizens of Istanbul. For Pamuk 
the citizens of Istanbul who cannot totally be free from the closed, introverted, insular 
Turkish culture and who could thus only be “themselves” in family albums or during 
snapshots, managed to gaze at Dernek and Turan’s camera with a certain freedom. He 
adds that while in the portraits “we”45 give to others we tend to be overcautious about 
the way we look, we seem to let ourselves be free from such concerns: 
 
In the portraits of us taken by strangers, there is an air of unfamiliarity and fear; we 
adjust our self, our dress and our gaze. However, in Süreyya Yılmaz Dernek’s and 
Ergün Turan’s photographs that expose us with all of our characteristics, we both are as 
we are and we smile free from the panic of being seen by a stranger (2002, 15).46 
 
 
It thus seems that for Pamuk, Dernek and Turan captured something different and 
unusual, something which seems to be different than the usual attitudes of Turkish 
people and/or any single individual in front of the camera. In fact, as this chapter 
will aim to demonstrate, their portraits seem to reveal an unobserved side of the act 
of posing, that is, its potential to induce in the poseur a freedom from (self-) 
identification, from trying to “be” someone, revealing the discontinuity and 
otherness that exists within what we call the “self”.  Let’s start then by seeing more 
in detail the traces of such discontinuity and otherness by focusing on these two 
major aspects observable in Dernek and Turan’s photographs.  
                                                                                                                                                               
bir pano. Panonun önünde duran birbirinden farklı insanlar. Kendilerine ait ne varsa, bütün hikayeleri ile 
bize bakıyorlar. Onlar bizim dünyamız. Onlar, BİZ.” From the back cover of “Biz”. My Translation. 
45 Pamuk uses “we” not only to refer to human beings in general but also to the poseurs of Turan and 
Dernek.  
46“Başkalarına çektirdiğimiz portrelerde bir yabancılık, bir korku havası eser; kendimize, kıyafetimize ve 
bakışlarımıza bir çeki düzen veririz. Süreyya Yılmaz Dernek ile Ergün Turan’ın bizleri olduğumuz gibi, 
bütün özelliklerimizle gösteren bu fotoğraflarında ise hem kendimiz gibiyiz, hem de bir yabancıya 
gözükmenin telaşından arınmış gülümsüyoruz.” My translation. 
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5.2.2 Moments of “emptiness” in between the “staged” and the 
“unstaged” 
Above is a man (Figure 19) who gives the impression that he could have been 
standing not in front of the camera but on the street, gazing at something far away, 
perhaps the sea. The cigarette that is about to fall from the edge of his lips and the 
fact that he is mixing the drink he holds in his hands, gives him an air of not caring so 
much about posing.  
Moreover, the fact that he is standing very loosely, his left leg inclined 
slightly to the side increases this effect. He also seems not to care about his 
Fig.19 
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appearance. His hair is disordered and his shirt collar is opened carelessly. His 
clothes are dirty and worn. He looks like a construction worker captured during his 
break. He also seems to have been taken out of his context and put in front of the 
black panel very suddenly.  
If we move closer, we can observe something in his eyes. His eyes appear to 
be as if they are focused on an invisible point situated behind the photographer’s 
head. He seems like his is frozen for a moment in his thoughts. He is one of those 
figures in the book that seem a bit out of context, as if only his body was posing 
while his thoughts are somewhere else. We may also sense that he is dazed.  
Unlike some other poseurs who seem to believe in their pose seriously (such 
as figures 20 and 21), this man seems to be caught in between posing and not posing. 
Although he agreed to pose for the photographers, he seems not to be maintaining a 
certain pose. Rather he looks like he is caught at a moment in which he gave up any 
concerns about the way he would have been seen.  
Fig.20 Fig.21 
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We can observe a similar air of 
being dazed and free from any 
concern about posing, in figure 
22, and especially in the pose of 
the girl. 
First of all, unlike the 
boy standing next to her, she is 
not looking directly at the 
camera, but at a point that is on 
the right of the camera lens. 
Perhaps she is looking at the 
other photographer who is not 
shooting at the moment. 
Secondly, she reflects in her body an air of giving up, of letting go. Her arms and 
shoulders seem looser compared to the boy’s posture.  
The boy, although he seems to want to give a cool and relaxed impression, 
by looking at the camera directly and even maintaining a positive attitude, is 
however more tense in his upper body, probably because his hands are stuck into his 
pockets and he looks in his upper body more stiffed, compared to the girl’s 
indifferent and careless pose.  
We might thus say that the girl looks as if she is careless about what is going 
on (compared to the boy) at this moment. We can also say that she seems perhaps be 
protecting herself, by deploying an “unpretentious”, “uncaring” air as a mask to hide 
herself. But she seems nevertheless less protective compared to other figures (such 
Fig.22 
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as Figures 27, 28, 29) of the project. I would rather rank her among the people who 
have a “blank” air like the man of Figure 19.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can find this air of “blankness” in many other photographs of the book and more 
frequently in children. In Figure 23 for example, the little girl who sells tissues has 
an air of blankness in the sense that her eyes seem to be free from any thought or 
awareness about the moment of the pose. She also seems disturbed, as if she is trying 
to understand what is going on.  
One characteristic of this project is that unlike Sander’s poseurs, none of the 
people that constitute “Biz” planned to pose in front of the camera beforehand. As a 
result, the poseurs are perhaps trying to adapt to the unexpected stopping of their 
Fig.23 
 121
everyday life for a few minutes of posing in front of a stage-like dark background 
panel, facing a photographer with whom they are not familiar. Thus they seem to 
have lost their conscious thoughts about this moment of posing.  
Imagine that you are walking on the street with your everyday thoughts, 
plans, and problems. Suddenly someone interrupts this flow and asks you to “stop” 
for a moment of posing. It is probable that you may feel a little shock and even may 
experience a “blankness” and “emptiness” in this passage from one state of existence 
to the other, from being within the flow of thoughts and the world, to a moment of 
stopping in silence. Like the girl who sells the napkins or the little girl in the next 
photograph (Figure 24), you may experience a state of emptiness, disconnected 
from yourself for a while, perhaps questioning and trying to understand what is 
going on. 
 In fact, unlike the 
accordionist girl in Figure 
24 who seems to be 
consciously responding to 
the camera by showing off 
her accordion and looking 
into the camera with an 
air of knowing what she is 
doing, the little girl sitting 
next to her seems to be 
more caught up in a 
moment she was not in 
control of. She seems to 
Fig.24 
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have just sat down or to be about to stand up from the stool she is sitting on. The 
object she is holding in her left hand is slightly blurred and this shows that she is 
caught up in a movement. Also, her right foot is curved slightly inwards, which 
increases the feeling that she is not sitting comfortably and is thus ready to move or 
change her position.  But more than this, in her expression we can see the trace of a 
shock (the open mouth for example), so that she looks as if at this moment she has 
lost any control, or conscious thought concerning the moment in which she is 
posing. She thus looks as if she is in-between posing and not posing.  
In all of the figures we have observed so far there is indeed an “in-
betweenness” between posing (as the subjects are aware of the camera) and not 
posing, since some unexpected expression or state of being is also caught, as in a 
snapshot. It is as if in such moments the poseur inevitably lets escape from his/her 
pose something that the camera witnesses, something that is beyond his/her control 
and actual awareness.  Maybe the camera catches the letting-go of the “self”.  
What is significant in these photographs is that they seem to foreground both 
the “staged” and the “unstaged” at the same time. On the one hand, there is a 
conscious staging prepared by the photographers. The black panel they carry with 
them everywhere is like a mobile theatre background that neutralises all the different 
districts they travelled to and which helps the passers-by to adapt to the mood of 
posing. 
 However, it seems from the photographs we have analysed so far that not 
all of the passers-by can adapt or can “play” (pose) according to the request of the 
photographers. Despite their staginess, these photographs reflect some “unstaged”, 
“un-expected” moments (not explicitly visible as in snapshots in general) but 
implicitly visible in the gaze and stance of the poseurs.  
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It is perhaps because Dernek and Turan wanted to capture their “citizens” as 
unmasked as possible so that they wanted to catch their “empty” moments. The 
result is that in some of the photographs they shot we can observe the “unstaged”, 
the unthought, and even the unconscious moments of the poseurs, to the point that 
they even look a bit puzzled, out of place, disconnected from their “self” and in 
between posing and not posing.  
A similar kind of in-betweenness between the “staged” and the “unstaged” 
was more visible and inevitable in the early years of photographic practice, because 
of the limitations of the first photographic cameras. Henry M. Sayre in his article 
“Rhetoric of the Pose: Photography and the Portrait as Performance” discusses the 
ways in which early photography may emphasise the conflict between the “staged” 
and the “unstaged”. For him the particularity of the early photographic image is its 
ability to function as being a snapshot and a composition at the same time (1986, 
49). 
Because of the limitations of the photographic apparatus, if any unexpected 
movement occurs during the shooting, 
the resulting image is blurred, 
witnessing in a way the movement 
within the composition. This blurring 
shows that despite the effort to control 
the composition, the camera remains 
nevertheless an apparatus, which has the 
potential to catch an “unstaged” 
moment and thus to disturb the security 
of any staged composition.  Fig.25 
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In order to illustrate the tension between the ‘’staged” and the “unstaged” within a 
photograph, Sayre refers to a photograph executed in 1858 by the Paris studio of Mayer 
Frères et Peirson, and entitled The Prince Imperial on His Pony (Fig.25). This 
photograph which is meant to represent the son of Napoleon III, in an imperial pose on 
his pony, is similar to Dernek and Turan’s photographs in the sense that it also has a 
staged background in front of which the little boy and his pony are asked to stand. 
However, this photograph loses its staginess by capturing as well Napoleon’s dog, that 
seems to go out of the frame and that is captured in a blurry movement. 
 According to Sayre, this uncanny existence of an unexpected movement brings 
a certain ambiguity to the power of the photographic camera by reminding us that, 
unlike any other form of visual representation, the photographic camera can capture 
moments or details that can disrupt the stability and security of its intended narrative. 
Sayre adds that the unexpected movement of the dog that falls out of the frame attracts 
our attention in a way similar to what Roland Barthes described as the punctum (1986, 
49). 
  If we return to the photographs of “Biz” we can also observe the presence of 
such moments, especially in the facial expression of the poseurs. Although in general 
some of the figures tend to make an attempt at self-possession or desire to take control 
of their appearance, in the photographs from “Biz” that we have so far analysed, the 
poseurs seem not to be driven by such a desire for control. Rather, they stare from an 
“emptiness”. Their expression seems to indicate an awareness of being exposed to the 
camera/gaze, but they also seem to “be” at that moment without any calculated 
stratagem and thus they are not supporting their stare. Moreover, some of them expose 
some indifference vis-à-vis posing. All this results in the appearance of some 
unexpected stances and stares. 
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Moreover, if we focus on the children (figures 23 and 24) we can see that their faces 
seem to question, to try to understand, to be doubtful in the face of this moment of 
posing as if saying: “What am I supposed to do?” This moment of doubt is also a 
moment in which they are unable to lose themselves in a role, to become one with their 
pose. In this way, they bear the traces of “emptiness”.  
Giorgio Agamben in his book Means without Ends argues that human beings do 
not have any essence, any nature, or any specific destiny. They are empty and 
insubstantial. This emptiness is so painful that they have an interminable desire to fill it 
by appropriating their appearance (2000, 93). Perhaps in the case of some of the 
photographs of Ergün and Turan’s poseurs this emptiness is easily welcomed and not 
turned into a self-appropriation.  
Therefore, perhaps the moment of posing is a moment of absence as well as a 
presence, because in that moment of emptiness one may feel absent from one’s “self”, 
from what he/she believes to be his/her identity. Thus the moment of posing may be a 
moment of the absence of the “self”, even if momentarily, in which the subject may 
experience the impossibility of self-identity. It is a moment in which time seems to stop 
flowing and an unexpected “moment” of the subject is revealed. 
Moreover, while considering the act of posing in the “posing” section of the 
third chapter, we saw that the act of posing is also an act in which the poseur “performs” 
or “enacts” a self-portrait. Therefore we may also consider the pose as a self-portrait. I 
want thus to return to what Lacoue-Labarthe argues about the self-portrait in order to 
reveal how his argument can be related to the act of posing.  
Lacoue-Labarthe in Le Portrait de L’Artiste en Général, refers to an abolition of 
time while discussing the self-portrait. As we have already seen in the third chapter, 
Lacoue-Labarthe bases his main argument on an analysis of Urs Lüthi’s self-portraits. 
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He argues that the self-portrait in general is an alloportrait47 that is the portrait of the 
“other”. For him the self-portrait is always the portrait of the “other” because it captures 
one instance out of the subject’s temporal existence and therefore it represents it as 
“other” to itself because the subject cannot be reduced to one instance as it is an 
existence in flow. It is perhaps because of this that we cannot easily recognise our self-
portraits.  
Therefore, the self-portrait is a representation of the abolition of time because 
the moment it represents is a moment in which the poseur is taken out of the flow of 
time and in which the subject cannot resemble its “self”. To be clear let’s refer to 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s account of the alloportrait: 
The self-portrait… is in fact an allo-portrait: a portrait of nobody or of what Blanchot 
calls, in his texts on the image, “Someone without figure”: “that which appears precisely 
only in the time of the absence of time”, the ceaseless, imminent and always differed 
coming of death, where “what is present does not present anything, represents itself, 
belongs right now and always to the return”: in loneliness indeed (1979, 42).48 
 
It seems that for Lacoue-Labarthe, the self-portrait is a representation that defers the 
subject. It is a representation in which the subject cannot “represent” its “self” because 
the self-sameness never occurs.  
In accordance with this argument Lacoue-Labarthe, in an introduction to a 
photographic book called Théâtre des Réalités, argues that although the word “re-
presentation” is understood as imitation because of the prefix re- (giving it a value of 
doubling and seconding) it means to render present. Basing his argument on Diderot’s 
analysis of the theatrical act, he argues that an actor is not someone who reproduces the 
                                                           
47
 “Allo-portrait”. Quoted from Le Portrait de L’Artiste en Général, p.42 The prefix “allo” comes from 
the Greek “allos” meaning “other”.  
 
48
 “L’autoportrait…est de fait alloportrait: portrait de personne ou bien de ce que Blanchot appelle, dans 
ses textes sur l’image, le “Quel qu’un sans figure”: “celui qui n’apparait précisément que dans le temps 
de l’absence de temps”, l’incessante, imminente et toujours differé venue de la mort, la ou… ‘ce qui est 
présent ne présente rien, se représente, appartient d’ores et déja et de tout temps au retour’: dans la 
solitude en effet.” My translation. 
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gestures of another, it is rather someone who presents and makes a character exist, 
someone who ‘builds up’ a character. Therefore any act of self-representation might be 
considered as an act of creation, or production, as we also mentioned in the second 
chapter while discussing the paradoxes of portraiture. (1996, 115) 
Moreover, according to Marianne Hirsh who provides a reading of Lacoue-
Labarthe’s book in “Masking the subject: practicing theory”, the subject of self-portraits 
exists in time always as “other” in several ways. First of all, he/she is the 
misapprehended imaginary “other” of the mirror stage (what Lacan calls the “moi”), “the 
self as externally given and recognised as a projected and absent self/other” (1994, 
113). Secondly he/she is a personne in the double sense of person and no-one. Hirsh adds 
that for Lacoue-Labarthe, by selecting one instant out of the subject’s temporal 
existence, Lüthi’s photographs stage the subject’s own specular self-encounter with 
otherness: the subject represented in the photograph is always “other” to the subject 
looking at his/her own portrait. 
  Therefore, if we consider the act of posing as a moment of performing a self-
portrait (as we saw in the third chapter) we can also argue that the subject posing 
(performing his/her self-portrait) might expose an “otherness” similar to what is 
mentioned above.  
I want to reveal the existence of such “otherness” by analysing some other 
photographs from “Biz” where the poseurs seem to protect themselves and are even 
looking in a hostile way at the camera. Let’s now focus on such instances in order to 
reveal the possibility that in a self-protective way of self-projection lies the possibility of 
encountering the presence of “otherness”.  
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5.2.3 Encountering “otherness” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast with the previous photographs analysed in this chapter, we are facing 
now a man who seems to have a different reaction to the camera/gaze/photographer 
(Figure 26). First of all, his body’s position is very stiff so that it gives the impression 
that he is tense. What increases this effect is the way he holds the white object in his 
left hand. He seems to be frightened that the object will fall so he wants to hold it 
firmly and maybe also to feel himself more secure. This object, which is hard to 
Fig.26 
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identify, (maybe a yogurt container) might symbolically signify something he does 
not want to give up: it may symbolise the identity he wants to protect. 
 The way he gazes at the camera is also very self-protective. His facial 
muscles also seem tense, for example he is frowning. His eyes are staring firmly as 
well and show traces of an anxiety mixed with anger. He also looks as if he is 
standing in the position of a guard.  
Departing from this analysis we can say that he seems both self-protective 
and anxious. Moreover, he looks as if he has been placed in front of the camera like a 
puppet (as he is standing stiffly, symmetrically and in a (self-) controlled way in front 
of the dark panel, without any room for chance encounters or uncontrolled 
gestures) but also, this air of self-control increases the effect of being very tense and 
anxious and creates the impression that he does not want to lose his “self”.  
This act of self-protection might point to the presence of the “other”. When one 
tries to protect oneself, it is by an imperative to frame, to protect oneself from what is 
“other”, what is different, what is alien and unknown. In this example, the pose seems 
to be a protective disguise, hiding or controlling the spontaneous expression of the 
poseur. In this respect we can perhaps argue that while posing, we might not only face 
the “other” that exists outside us (the photographer, the camera or the potential 
observer of the photographs) but also we might encounter the “other” within us, 
because, we might find ourselves in a moment of transforming our “self” into the 
“other” while protecting our “self”.  
In other words, when one assumes a protective pose, one is not only implying 
the presence of the “other” outside him/herself, but also, he/she is transforming 
him/her self into an “other”, both to him/herself and to others. 
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Therefore, this man, through his self-protective pose, implies on the one hand that 
the presence of the camera/gaze is the presence of the “other”. On the other hand, 
he makes visible the tension existing within himself by seemingly experiencing 
himself as “other” to others. In his posture and facial expression he thus creates an 
atmosphere of tension, repudiating the presence of the camera/gaze instead of 
welcoming it. A similar welcoming also happens with the girl at the right side of the 
next figure (Figure 27).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this photograph (Figure 27) we are indeed facing two opposite reactions vis-à-vis 
the camera/gaze. The girl on the right seems much more welcoming, amenable, and 
Fig.27 
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easy-going in the moment of the pose than the girl of the left, who is explicitly 
protecting herself by crossing her arms in front of her.  
Moreover, the girl on the left seems very severe, austere, and unkind in her 
expression. Unlike the man of the previous photograph, she does not seem to be 
fearful but rather she displays self-trust and she explicitly defies the moment of her 
photograph being taken.  
The other girl next to her seems, however, more loose and open in her 
posture, her body is more relaxed and her facial expression is less protective. The 
coexistence of these two opposite reactions increases the effect that when one is self-
protective, angry or anxious, one makes visible the line that exists between 
him/herself and the “other”. It makes visible the separation, the conflict, the 
differences that separate one’s “self” 
from others.  
With the next photograph 
(Figure 28) we can continue to 
consolidate our argument because 
like the two previous photographs it 
makes visible the presence of 
“otherness”. We are facing again an 
individual who seems both a bit in 
conflict and also hopeless. We can 
read on his face the trace of some 
anger mixed with an air of 
helplessness. He looks as if he is 
Fig.28 
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disturbed by the fact that he has to give a pose. Or he appears to be judging and/or 
criticising the photographer’s intention to take his picture. Also the way in which he 
is withdrawing his left arm into his jacket creates a feeling that he is shy and he might 
feel tense. Again, he seems not at peace with the moment of the pose but rather, he 
looks very uneasy with his “self”. He seems to be experiencing at this moment an 
alienation from his “self”, a becoming “other” not only to his “self” but to others.  
In all the poseurs we have observed in this section there is a manifestation of 
the presence of “otherness”, and they seem to reveal that the posing subject might 
perform the codes of encounter between the self and the other. In other words, in 
the photographs we have analysed in this section, the posing subject seems to 
experience a moment where he/she encounters an enactment of “otherness” while 
protecting him/herself from the other, the unknown.   
In this chapter we thus saw that the poseurs might exhibit some incongruities at 
the moment of the pose that is manifested in the form of discontinuity, (self-) conflict, 
in-betweenness and (self-) alienation, all this preventing the subject from relating to its 
“self” in a continuous and affirmative way.   
I believe that those conflicting, alienated, discontinuous states of  selfhood not 
only result in a questioning of the nature of the “self”, but also point to the presence of 
an  “emptiness” that characterises the subject. This “emptiness” will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter. For now, I want to end this chapter by arguing that what we have 
seen throughout this chapter is that the moment of posing is a moment in which the 
poseur might expose the impossibility of defining, recognising and/or affirming his/her 
“self” according to the parameters of self-sameness and thus creating a space for 
“looking” at his/her “self” in a productive way. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
While shooting a portrait I am not 
searching for a story. Even if for a small 
moment, I am searching for the silence 
existing within the person. I am on my 
knees in front of him, both of us are 
silent. Sometimes we blink, but not too 
much. A total silence. When you meet 
someone there is always a prejudice in 
your mind. But erasing this and 
watching, is always the best.49 
 
Henri Cartier Bresson 
Henri Cartier Bresson? 
 
 
In the epigraph above Henri Cartier Bresson, the famous French photographer of the 
1940s seems to draws our attention to a magical space of silence existing between the 
photographer and his poseur. It seems that for him, the moment of photographing his 
poseur is a moment of pure silence in which there is the potential to experience 
something new, freed from prejudices.  
Perhaps in this moment of silent interaction between the photographer and the 
poseur, Bresson finds a space of freedom from the mind and an opening to endless 
possibilities of encountering and embracing the unexpected, the unknown, something 
that goes beyond the desire to, “capture” the (hi-)story and the “essence” of the posing 
individual. 
 In awe of this mysterious moment of silence that is however not without 
communication, this project is born out of a desire to analyse the human condition of 
emptiness that can manifest itself in the necessity and/or the desire to relate to (self-) 
images.  
                                                           
49 This passage is from a film (by Sara Moon) about Henri Cartier Bresson entitled: “Henri Cartier 
Bresson?”. The Turkish translation of this passage, was published and distributed in an exhibition 
dedicated to him in the Pera Museum in İstanbul, February 2006. The translation in the epigraph is thus 
my translation of from this Turkish translation. 
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In fact, humans, have a significant particularity: they are interested in mirrors, in the 
image as image. Giorgio Agamben argues that human beings separate images from 
things and give them a name because they want to recognise themselves. For Agamben 
to recognize is to take possession of the (self-) appearance that is inevitably exposed, 
inevitably in the open. All beings are exposed in the sense that they manifest 
themselves, they have an inevitable appearance. But only the human being feels the urge 
to “transform the open into a world” (2000, 92). Therefore it takes possession of its 
own appearance. It turns its own openness into an image it wants to identify with. 
This desire for (self-) possession, this urge to be attached to the “self”, comes 
perhaps from a fear of facing this abyssal emptiness that is an inevitable part of the 
“self”. It can also be related to a fear of disappearing and of dying. Agamben adds that: 
“…human beings neither are nor have to be any essence, any nature, or any specific 
destiny, their condition is the most empty and the most insubstantial of all” (2000, 94).  
This thesis aimed thus at “touching” this emptiness by revealing the ways it 
might be felt, experienced and manifested. But how can one “touch” this inevitable part 
of the human condition? What can we write about it? And how can we write about it? 
I believe that starting from the place that seems to be the most unlikely would 
be a good idea. Therefore this thesis started searching the manifestations of this 
emptiness in a moment that seems to be the very opposite of it, a moment where the 
subject tries consciously to assume, to appropriate, to become attached to an identity: 
the moment of posing in front of the photographic camera, the moment Bresson refers 
to as the “pure silence” where the portrayed subject, unlike in snapshots, looks into the 
camera and exhibits the awareness of being exposed to the camera/gaze.  
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In that precise moment, Agamben argues, “the insubstantial nature of the human face 
suddenly comes to light” (2000, 93). Moreover, for him the fact that the poseur looks 
at the camera means that he/she is conscious that he/she is posing, simulating. Posing is 
thus a moment where the subject exhibits an enactment of an identity but also becomes 
aware of the impossibility of this enactment.  
Therefore, the very attempt by the subject to pose, to assume an identity, can 
paradoxically point to the presence of this emptiness that is an inevitable part of his/her 
“self”. In other words, the fact that the subject consciously poses and makes visible the 
artificiality of its pose, might point to the presence of the emptiness that characterises 
him/her. In other words, any attempt to enact identity on the part of the poseur is 
possible because of the presence of this emptiness, because what we call the “self” is 
governed by a dynamic existing between presence and absence and/or emptiness. Thus 
when the subject poses, the very possibility of his/her pose comes from the presence of 
this emptiness which is an inevitable part of his/her selfhood. 
Through a detailed analysis of images of posing subjects, this thesis engaged thus 
to reveal the human emptiness that can manifest itself in the moment of posing in front 
of the camera and argued that at that moment the subject might reveal and expose an 
emptiness. In other words, this thesis argued that it is in the moment of posing that the 
subject might be faced with the inability of attaching him/herself to any identity. The 
moment of posing can thus be considered as a moment at which the subject might fail to 
consolidate or to frame its subjectivity. 
The desire to become attached to a self-image, or the desire to recognise our 
“self” in (self-) images, is visible in any act of (self-) “representation” and especially 
portraiture. This thesis started thus by providing an account of how and why the 
relationship between the subject and its image is created, by focusing first on 
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portraiture and its paradoxes in order to analyse later the particularity of posing for 
photography as compared to painting.  
Following this, it offered a theoretical analysis of the act of posing by giving a 
psychoanalytical and philosophical account of the relationship between the subject and 
its image in order to argue that, although posing has been an indispensable part of 
portraiture, posing for photography has its own characteristics not only because of the 
presence of the camera (an alien machine) between the photographer and the poseur, 
but also because of the assumed power of  photography to confer and impose an identity 
on the posing individual. 
Indeed, portraits made by painters had been conceived as bearing the traces of 
the artist’s “touch”, but photographic portraits had rather been conceived as the imprint 
of the poseur’s appearance. Therefore photographic portraits claimed a power; they 
impose an identity on the subject at the expense of his/her being.  
As Marianne Hirsh also argues in “Masking the Subject: Practicing Theory”, 
when we are photographed in the context of social conventions we wear masks, 
fabricate ourselves according to certain expectations and are fabricated by them. We 
are also constructed by our photographic representation by the click of the camera in 
the sense that, once we are photographed we are reduced to an image over which we 
have no power over, and knowing this, we tend to construct, create an image of 
ourselves before the camera imposes its own image on us (1994, 117). 
Therefore, posing in front of the camera is a moment where there is manifested 
a desire or an attempt to become attached to a unique, unshakeable identity. However, 
despite this attempt, the moment of posing can also reveal the impossibility of (self-) 
recognition and (self-) identification mainly because at that moment the subject might 
expose more dramatically the impossibility of coinciding with his/her image.  
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This impossibility is analysed and supported in this thesis not only through a 
conversation between theoretical texts but also through a visual analysis of two different 
photographic projects by August Sander and by Ergün Turand and Süreyya Yılmaz 
Dernek.  
Those projects, although belonging to different periods of time and different 
cultures, reflect a similar style exposition of individuals (similar choice of compositional 
framing for example) that seem to put into question (self-) identification in different 
ways. Departing from this analysis this thesis focused on the possible outcome of this 
questioning that is its potential to provide the subject with a productive look at his/her 
“self”. Looking productively towards the “self” is a way of perceiving the self that is not 
driven by a desire to fulfil its lack, but rather to be able to let the “self” face the 
emptiness that characterizes it being. Therefore the productive look brings a possibility 
of perceiving the “self” freed from any parameters, desires, or attachments to a specific 
“image” of the self.   
This thesis aimed thus to question (self-) recognition and (self-) attachment, 
with referrence to images of posing people, not only to reveal that posing may be a 
moment of questioning the assumed power of the photographic camera but also to open 
up a way of considering it as a moment in which the essential emptiness of the human 
condition appears.  
In other words, this thesis has analysed the relationship between the subject and 
its image and questioned the process of (self-) recognition and/or (self-) identification 
by focusing on the act of posing and by providing a productive communication between 
visual and theoretical texts.   
 The desire informing this thesis was to explore and expose the human 
condition of emptiness, and to show the ways it is manifested, in order to remind us 
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that what we call “subjectivity” cannot be reduced to a singular state of existence. 
Rather, this thesis pointed to moments where subjects are unable to identify with 
and/or hold on to their “self”. 
 In other words, this thesis explored the possibility of conceiving human 
identity as fluid and fugitive, rather than fixed and stable. It also revealed that this 
identity can manifest itself in a moment which seemed to be paradoxically the opposite, 
the moment of posing in front of the camera, the moment in which the subject is 
tempted to assume, create, hold on to an identity, but is nevertheless reminded of the 
impossibility of having any stable identity. Indeed, as Michel Pane also argues in a re-
reading of Barthes’ Camera Lucida: 
What one wants but does not get (cannot get) is a mobile image of one’s 
profound self, but there is never a coincidence of oneself with the image of 
oneself. Thus to refer to any human subject as one-self is always misleading 
(1997, 84). 
 
The plurality existing at the heart of subjectivity might lead to an awareness of the 
impossibility of forming an attachment to any of these “images” and impressions of the 
self, revealing thus the emptiness existing in the human condition, like the silence 
existing between words. 
 What we experience as the “self” might thus be an experience of a fugitive, 
evasive existence, unable to be inserted into a specific identity. It is like an existence 
without any land to stay, like that of nomads. It is thus not surprising that August 
Sander, although driven by a desire to “capture” and categorise the individuals of his 
society, could not avoid devoting a great deal of importance to individuals who perhaps 
explicitly belonged to this state of existence. In the section “itinerants” of  Citizens of the 
20th Century we can see photographs of people who lived in that space of in-
betweenness, like the Gypsy of Figure 30.  
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This photograph is one of the more unusual photographs of the book because it has a 
more artistic touch compared with the other generally “objective- looking” photographs 
of the entire project. The Gypsy is sharply focused, as if Sander wanted to capture him, 
to hold him still, while leaving the background softly blurred. His posture is very 
flexible in the sense that he stands in a welcoming way, slightly forwards, his hand 
gently placed in his pocket and his look slightly submissive.  
The way he stands is thus not a rigid, straight, self-confident and assertive 
posture. Rather, he seems to be in harmony with the fluid, organic background and he 
seems neither in conflict with his surroundings nor rejecting the photographer who is 
taking his picture.  
Despite Sander’s efforts to separate and delimit his appearance from the 
background, he has an air of carelessness, of “letting go” because he has a gentle, 
flexible stance as if he does not want to be noticed. Also he is one of those rare figures 
in the book who is not posing rigidly but who rather appears to be caught in movement 
and just stopped for a moment while he was walking. The way he holds his hat increases 
this sense of being stopped in the midst of some movement as he is holding it in a 
careless attitude, not really “holding” it but rather coexisting with it.  
Moreover, the fact that his hand and the hat are slightly blurred increases the 
effect of being in harmony with the background as if he was going to disappear into the 
background. This seemingly humble man, on whose face we see the reflection of the 
sun, is perhaps welcoming his emptiness and lack, instead of resisting it, and he is 
staring at us from a point that also invites us to look back at our “self”.  Like other 
photographs analysed in this thesis, this photograph witnesses and makes the viewer 
witness the unavoidable condition of all human existence while pushing us to re-
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consider our “subjectivity” as well as the act of posing and its problematisation of (self-) 
recognition and/or (self-) identification. 
 
Fig. 29 Gypsy, 1928 
Gypsy, 1928 
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